Boots on the Ground, Bombs in the Air

Abstract

Boots on the Ground, Bombs in the Air Glenn C. Altschuler (bio) Brian McAllister Linn. Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016. 540pp. Notes and index. $29.95. When World War II ended, the United States Army demobilized. By 1948, the number of men and women in uniform had declined from 8,267,000 to 554,000. Leaders of the service had recommended that one million soldiers remain on active duty, along with several million trained reservists. But presidents Truman and Eisenhower, Congress, and a majority of U.S. citizens believed that atomic weapons and long-range bombers could offset the superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional forces and protect the nation’s security. That conclusion was not fundamentally shaken by the decision to put U.S. boots on the ground in the Korean War. In this context, Brian McAllister Linn, a professor of history at Texas A&M University, reminds us that the U.S. Army tried to re-invent itself. In Elvis’s Army, Linn provides a detailed account of efforts by Army brass to recruit, equip, train, and retain personnel, align tactics and strategy to Cold War realities, and compete with the Navy and Air Force for budgetary appropriations and prestige. In one respect, Elvis’s Army is a “bait and switch” offering: Mr. Presley, who was drafted in 1958 and served honorably, faithfully, and without complaint, makes but a few brief appearances. That said, Linn’s book is a valuable examination of—and a cautionary tale about—the challenges of identifying a role for soldiers on the atomic battlefield. Throughout the 1950s, Linn points out, the U.S. Army was not a popular institution. A survey in 1955 revealed that only one in ten teenagers expressed an interest in enlisting. One in four thought that career soldiers stayed in service because they could not get good civilian jobs. Nor was the draft all that helpful in adding skilled individuals to the army. Throughout the decade, with deferments, exemptions, and rejections on physical, mental, and moral grounds, “the draft pool shrank to a puddle” (p. 143). In January 1958, a mere 2,100,000 of almost 20,000,000 males who registered for the draft were classified 1-A. Both enlistees and inductees tended to be poorly educated, [End Page 337] poorly motivated, and determined to leave after they had received a modicum of training. Among radar technicians, aircraft maintenance mechanics, and communications personnel, the three-year turnover rate approached 100 percent. With retirements of World War II and Korean War veterans and a steep decline in ROTC graduates remaining on active duty, moreover, the Army faced shortages in the ranks of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel: the very people it needed to organize, distribute, and maintain the high-tech equipment of a “new age” military. For much of the decade, Linn insists, the army spent precious resources on an air-defense missile system whose “military utility was problematic.” In 1958, the cost of missiles equaled that of all other munitions. And “the gamble of hitting the jackpot” with a superweapon delayed the development of tanks, infantry vehicles, and helicopters, and impeded the recruitment and training of enlisted men, volunteers, and officers (p. 108). To its credit, Linn reveals, the army did take steps to improve the educational and vocational skills of many soldiers. Recruits with minimum scores were given intensive remedial courses to bring them up to a fourth-grade level in reading, writing, and mathematics. At the end of the 1950s, about 60 percent of the army’s 900,000 personnel were enrolled in at least one course. A high school diploma was required for reenlistment or promotion to sergeant, with a college degree mandated for officers. And the army established schools to teach enlisted personnel “Military Occupational Specialties.” Linn also provides interesting details about the integration of the army. To address significant losses of combat forces during the Korean War, officers, without waiting for authorization from headquarters, began to transfer black soldiers to white units and to assign replacements based on needs, not race. Despite opposition from some commanders, the policy remained in force...