Book review: The I in the We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition, by Axel Honneth

Abstract

Axel Honneth The I in the We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition, Polity Press: Cambridge, 2012, 246 pp: 9780745652337, US$35 (pbk) Ever since the publication of The Struggle for Recognition (1995), Axel Honneth has been pursuing the Hegelian theme of 'recognition' as originally outlined in Hegel's Phenomenology (1807). The latest instalment is Honneth's The I in the We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition. A quasi-background of this can be found in the idea to move critical theory onto the theoretical and ethical platform of 'recognition', as discussed in Fraser and Honneth's Redistribution or Recognition (2003). To a large extent, The I in the We is a continuation of Honneth's project. The book has fourteen chapters, divided into four parts: 'Hegel's Roots', 'Systematic Consequences', 'Social and Theoretical Applications', and 'Psychoanalytical Ramifications'. What the book does not have is an introduction providing an overall discussion on Honneth's theme; and nor does it have a conclusion that could have comprehensively discussed 'what we could learn from all this'. After a very brief preface, Part 1 begins with a discussion on Hegel's concept of 'recognition', emphasising the fact that 'Hegel's text is especially difficult to understand'. In Chapter 2, 'The realm of actualised freedom', Honneth positions Hegel's work in its historical context, outlining 'the great disturbance caused by the Counter-Reform in Prussia', which according to d'Hondt (1988), was a period marred by the 'Carlsbad Decrees' of 1819, signifying an historical period of state censorship, reaction, and repression. It was in this period that Hegel wrote his second great book, Philosophy of Right (1821), on which Honneth notes, 'on the whole, the book gives the highly confusing impression', arguing that Hegel's 'three-stage network of institutionalised practices and structures has been completely travelled through [so that] the realm of actualised freedom ... will be presented in its entirety'. By this, Hegel meant the stages of family, civil society, and state. This is needed so that each stage can 'compensate for the flaws that characterise the previous stage'. In Chapter 3, 'The fabric of justice: On the limits of contemporary proceduralism', Honneth highlights the 'deficits of the distribution paradigm', perhaps not only because justice is linked to 'distributive justice', but also as a response to Nancy Fraser's 'distribution model'. For Honneth, justice is a 'reconstructive' issue. He notes, 'this alternative procedure could thus be termed reconstructive, because it does not construct an impartial standpoint from which to justify principles of justice, but reconstructs them out of the historical process of relations of recognition in which they are always already at work'. The chapter on justice is followed by a chapter on 'Labour and recognition: A redefinition', in which Honneth--correctly--notes that many intellectuals have 'turned their backs' on labour (Klikauer 2012), leaving labour relations dangerously exposed to neoliberal economics, human resources management, and management studies. Honneth argues that 'to share Hegel's and Durkheim's conviction that the capitalist labour market must not merely be a means of increasing economic efficiency, but also a medium of social integration ... everything depends on whether we decided to analyse the capitalist market from the perspective of system integration or social integration'. It might be a little problematic, though, to see 'capitalist labour markets' as mediums for 'social' integration, and not as institutions of 'system integration' (Lockwood 1964). The next chapter is on 'Recognition as ideology: The connection between morality and power'. Honneth writes, 'far from making a lasting contribution to the autonomy of the members of our society, social recognition appears merely to serve the creation of attitudes that conform to the dominant system. …