Abstract
Controlled experiments provided evidence that (1) employees are more likely to accept incentive contracts described in bonus terms than contracts that appear identical except for being described in penalty terms, and (2) when employees' judgment of their past performance is dependent on memory, the preference for bonus over penalty contracts increases with experience. These phenomena are explained in terms of the human information processing costs of communicating and evaluating the contract terms, and further implications are drawn for the empirical study of contracting.
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