Bonhoeffer's Theology of the Cross: The Influence of Luther in "Act and Being" by Josh de Keijzer

Abstract

Reviewed by: Bonhoeffer's Theology of the Cross: The Influence of Luther in "Act and Being" by Josh de Keijzer Chester O'Gorman Bonhoeffer's Theology of the Cross: The Influence of Luther in "Act and Being." By Josh de Keijzer. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018. 185 pp. Dutch theologian Josh de Keijzer (PhD Luther Seminary, 2017) argues that Luther's posthumously dubbed theologia crucis (theology of the cross), or key features of it, enables Bonhoeffer to resolve an important theological problem: that pertaining to act and being. That resolution, in turn, leads Bonhoeffer to a refashioned interpretation of Luther's theologia crucis for the twentieth century. De Keijzer focuses on Bonhoeffer's Habilitationsschrift "Act and Being" (1931). In Bonhoeffer's terminology, "act" is a reference to theological approaches that accent God's transcendence. These approaches preserve transcendence, but render problematic God's presence in a concrete, meaningful sense. Bonhoeffer uses the term, "being," in reference to theological interpretations that stress God's presence or immanence. In so doing, they risk domesticating God; that is to say, they eliminate God's transcendence and make God part of the world. In either case, if in opposite ways, they eliminate the possibility of God's grace. That elimination reinforces the present form of existence of the self and community. Bonhoeffer, of course, wants to have his cake and eat it too. A key feature of the theologia crucis is God's presence as Jesus Christ. Christians become part of Christ in Word and sacrament and together as a community. God is thereby made present in and as this community of faith. However, that presence risks domestication. Bonhoeffer, de Keijzer argues, avoids this problem through an interpretation of faith that borrows ideas from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Dasein, the key idea from Heidegger, refers to the unique kind of being of humans. With this concept, according to de Keijzer, [End Page 480] Heidegger maintains an insurmountable gap between being and what humans can know of that being. This gap is not transcendent, however; it is existential. Dasein is an ongoing project that comes to knowledge of itself only through engagement with its world, that is, in relation to a particular time and place with other human beings. Since this process is never-ending, this gap can never be closed. Bonhoeffer transposes this idea of Dasein to Christians in their community. In analogy to Dasein, Christians come to understand themselves in relation to the world they live in, foremost through Christ and the community of Christ. Since this community is an ongoing project that comes to understand its existence or being through its activity, it can never become closed or domesticated. In Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung in Beiträge zur historischen Theologie (Tübingen, 1999), Christiane Tietz-Steiding argues that Bonhoeffer's appropriation of Heidegger amounts to a misunderstanding and misapplication. De Keijzer suggests otherwise. I leave it to the Heidegger and Bonhoeffer scholars to settle the matter. Assuming that Bonhoeffer has formally succeeded in bringing together the transcendence and immanence of God, a number of questions remain that the theologian who follows Bonhoeffer must address if that success is to be considered a substantive one. I will offer one. If Dasein is open in an existential or immanent way, does not that render God superfluous? If "act" approaches are important because God's transcendence prevents both self and community from closing themselves off from the other or otherness, then Dasein no longer requires God or the transcendent. Bonhoeffer demonstrates some awareness of this challenge, but does not seem to address it. Perhaps this apparent superfluity of God is a seed that blossoms into the religionless Christianity of the later Bonhoeffer? I offer one criticism that intends to be both constructive and sympathetic. De Keijzer's book, at times, presents terms and ideas whose precise meanings are not always clear. Thus, their contribution to his argument can be a little obscure. That gripe aside, I find de Keijzer's elaboration of Bonhoeffer's objective both compelling and inspiring for future research that seeks to understand the complex relationship among Bonhoeffer, Luther, and Heidegger. I [End Page 481] should...