Abstract
This study examines bondholder and stockholder reactions to discretionary accounting changes that increase reported income to determine whether the changes are associated with a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders or with a loss in the wealth of both groups of investors. The evidence supports the wealth loss hypothesis. Negative relative returns to bondholders and stockholders appear to be related to the accounting changes after controlling the effects of earnings. The study examines earnings, management compensation, and debt covenant variables as possible motives for the accounting changes. It finds systematic differences between the change companies and matched nonchange companies on all three variables. The profile data are consistent with a setting in which managers use accounting changes to boost reported income and their own compensation during poor years.
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