Abstract
CEO succession is one of the most important transitions in any firm’s life cycle. However, despite substantive ramifications for the actors and the firm, and the potentially competing interests that can arise among the actors who influence the decision, there remains surprisingly little theory or exploration about the processes used for making executive succession decisions. Two competing parties, the Board of directors and the outgoing CEO, have strong interests in influencing succession processes. In this manuscript, we illustrate how these competing parties work to influence the succession planning process. Based on in-depth interviews with senior insiders, and survey data obtained from 156 Chief Human Resource Officers at large, primarily Fortune 500 firms, we develop and test theory about the planning processes and find that Boards try to increase the number of candidates evaluated and the use of external help. Simultaneously, we find that CEOs try to decrease the number of candidates evaluated and the likelihood that external help is used. Finally, the relationship between the board and the CEO positively moderates the relationship between Board processes and number of successors identified. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research on CEO succession and succession planning, in particular.
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