Abstract
Abstract Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective or felt qualities.1 The thesis is sometimes stated as a supervenience claim: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character (Lycan 1996a). In its strong form, representationalism is an identity thesis (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995, 2000). It asserts that phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions. Representationalists are sometimes also content-externalists. The combination of representationalism about phenomenal character with externalism about content yields phenomenal externalism (the view that qualia ain’t in the head).
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
