Abstract
This essay outlines Blumenberg’s work on the nature of metaphor from the first text published during his life, Paradigms of a metaphorology (1960), up to one of those that came out after his death, Theory of inconceptualism . This paper shows that it is not enough to study the performance of a metaphor in the formation of concepts, but, taking it as a thread in perspective of a regression to the world of life, it is also necessary to frame it in the broader horizon of a theory of inconceptualism. The metaphors would not be, therefore, provisional pre-logical structures destined to be afterwards substituted by clear and distinct ideas, but polysemic configurations that enrich the language, enhance its heuristic function and form the basis on which the tendency to univocity of the concepts will later develop.
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