Blumberg on Moral Criticism

Abstract

D. Blumbergi identifies three kinds of moral criticism: (i) of an individual for violating a moral practice in his society, (z) of a moral practice of a society but not of the individual who participates in it, and (3) of both an individual and the practice in accordance with which he acts ('practicepersonal' criticism) (p. 348). According to Mr. Blumberg, successful derivation of a conclusive 'ought'-statement from statements about socially-created obligations would show how moral criticisms of type i are justified. Moral criticisms of type z would still be allowed, but not those of type 3. I shall discuss the following points made by Blumberg: (A) Criticism of type i is 'the most common kind of moral judgment' (p. 356); (B) Searle dispensed 'with the conclusive aspect of the conclusion, and with it the finality of the derivation, when it began to seem unrealizable' (p. 356); (C) 'It is impossible to derive conclusive ought-statements embodying our traditional moral outlook from statements about sociallycreated obligations, . . .' (p. 355); (D) 'Either we surrender the attempt to derive a conclusive ought-statement from statements about sociallycreated obligations, or else we must surrender our right to make practicepersonal criticisms' (p. 357). Point A is indicative of the degree to which the essential structure of the problem lying behind Blumberg's paper is allowed to remain obscure. Point B is a sample of Blumberg's innuendo-filled remarks about Searle's work on institutional obligation. Points C and D (conclusions to sections II and III, respectively) are true and false, respectively, on the basis of fundamental distinctions given no attention by Blumberg.2 (A)-Criticism (commendation) of type i is non-fundamental3 and based on an inconsistency (consistency) between an action and an obligation. It is a claim that, given the moral practices of a society and the fact of x's obligation to observe them, x's non-conformity (conformity) is bad (good). Moreover, type i criticisms are not uniquely moral criticisms; they can be applied to any activity in so far as that activity is in violation of the rules by which it is constituted and/or regulated. The very fact that criticism of this type dominates everyday moral discourse indicates that fundamental moral issues already have been decided, that moral practices are indeed generally accepted rather than placed in question. Criticisms