Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy

Abstract

Lyndon Johnson loved an audience, especially a captive one, which is what he had. The White House press corps waited in an uneven arc before him in Oval Office. Some reporters sat in cream-fabric settees. Others stood beneath fixed gaze of Henry Clay's and Andrew Jackson's dark portraits. No one dared intrude beyond presidential seal woven into center of pale green rug that lay before President's mahogany desk: proscenium of stage. The fragrance of cut flowers and tension and a ragged silence hung heavy in air. The time had not yet come for words, but President sat behind his desk preparing for that moment, looking up occasionally to scrutinize spectators. Reporters are puppets, he once remarked. They simply respond to pull of most powerful strings. (1) Then, at precisely 4:15 p.m., on Tuesday, 22 March 1966, with his aides in their places, White House stenographers with their pencils and notepads at ready, and all preparations complete, Lyndon Johnson pulled strings and began 60th press conference of his presidency: am ready if you have any questions. (2) Balding and bespectacled with a booming voice, 44-year-old Robert Komer felt tug of string as well. Appointed Johnson's interim National Security Adviser when McGeorge Bundy left a few weeks before to head Ford Foundation, Komer later recalled that period as the most painful six weeks of my life. (3) Now, after responding to several reporters' questions, Johnson announced that Komer would assume a new position on White House staff. Johnson had earlier summoned Komer to Oval Office to discuss his new role. Bob, Johnson drawled when they sat together, I'm going to put you in charge of in Vietnam. Komer was unfamiliar with term the war. Mr. President, what's in Vietnam? I thought we only had Well, President replied, that's part of problem. I want to have a to build as well as to destroy. So I want to put you in charge of generating a massive effort to do more for people of South Vietnam, particularly farmers in rural areas, and your mandate will be an extensive one. In fact, I wrote it myself. Komer declared that he was no expert in Southeast Asia. The President parried his feeble protest. I've got too many people who claim to be long-standing experts. What we need is some fresh blood. (4) Komer knew that there was no argument he could muster to dissuade Johnson. Johnson's leadership style was simple: pick right man for job and rest would take care of itself. Johnson had decided that Bob Komer was right man; he got things done. Under this order, Robert Komer set out to implement President's goals for other war in Vietnam, goals that were staggeringly different and complex from large-unit being conducted there. In essence, to fight war, he had to redirect and harness activities of civilian agencies as well as military efforts to provide security and defeat Viet Cong guerrillas, as part of a better-coordinated US effort to support government of South Vietnam through a nation-building program known as pacification. This term had become a substitute for counterinsurgency in 1964-1965. (5) The story is edifying in terms of such significant contemporary issues as influence of bureaucratic politics, institutional bargaining, role of presidential staff, formulation and conduct of foreign policy, and use of nonmilitary instruments to wage war, especially counterinsurgency, as is occurring in Iraq today. Moreover, it is instructive as to sway a single person can have on national security policy by understanding and using levers of power. This is no small point. Richard Falkenrath, President George W. Bush's Deputy Homeland Security Adviser until May 2004, in speaking about senior leaders of Department of Homeland Security, remarked: Many officials at department were so inexperienced in grasping levers of power in Washington, and so bashful about trying, that they failed to make progress on some fronts. …