Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Chores with Mental Causation1

Abstract

In this paper I will revisit an that I have called supervenience argument; it is sometimes called exclusion argument in the literature.2 I want to reconsider several aspects of this in light of some of the criticisms and comments it has elicited, clarifying some points and offering a slightly reformulated?and improved?version of the argument. My primary aim, however, is to discuss and respond to Ned Block's edifying and challeng ing critique of the in his Do Causal Powers Drain Away?'3?in particular, his claim that the has the consequence that if there is no bottom microphysical level, causal powers will drain away, leaving us with no causation anywhere. The supervenience was designed to show that on a certain popular and influential view of mentality and its relationship to the physical, mental properties turn out to be epiphenomenal, that is, without causal powers of their own. The view of mentality that is the target of this is defined by the following three propositions: