Abstract

French Minister of War Andre Maginot became famous among military strategists for his fixation on a single route of attack that led to fatal neglect of alternatives. Seeking to defeat a German invasion along the primary East-West axis, Maginot constructed an impregnable line of fortifications in the 1930s that succeeded in preventing the attack he most feared. But when German panzers outflanked that line and rolled through Belgium in 1940, their attack from the rear led to France’s surrender in just six weeks. In concentrating so much of their mindshare on imposing constraints on Iran’s known nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Arak, are the US and its five negotiating partners at risk of creating a nuclear Maginot line?

Highlights

  • The ongoing negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 over a comprehensive nuclear agreement are intended to resolve longstanding disagreements about Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from sanctions imposed by the US, UN, and European Union

  • The ongoing negotiations, present a unique opportunity to address these additional paths within the framework of a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran

  • Our analysis aims to address the following challenge: how could a negotiated agreement assist in mitigating risks from all paths to an Iranian nuclear weapon?

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Summary

Executive Summary

French Minister of War Andre Maginot became famous among military strategists for his fixation on a single route of attack that led to fatal neglect of alternatives. With negotiations ongoing between Iran and the P5+1 about specific constraints on nuclear activities at Iran’s overt, declared sites, it is understandable that public debate focuses mostly on this path. In this spirit, the interim agreement reached in November essentially halts Iran’s nuclear advance at the 9,400 centrifuges currently spinning and a stockpile of 6-7 bombs’ worth of lowenriched uranium (LEU) and requires Iran to dilute or convert to oxide nearly one bomb’s worth of 20% enriched uranium produced prior to the agreement. As a complement to a negotiated agreement, and to ensure that it will be enforced, a UN Security Council resolution that authorizes the members to take action if Iran is caught covertly making or buying nuclear material could help deter Iran from deciding to do so

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