Blockchain Infrastructure with Fragments Dependent Security Deposit Solution

Abstract

Blockchain is considered a shared ledger technology to be a viable alternative for heavily focused control process applications. However, most of the current blockchain networks are used for the proof of work called the Hash-Puzzle-Solving Consensus Protocol. The competition to solve the puzzle leads to high latency, leading directly to a lengthy cycle of transaction processing. One solution to this problem is the establishment of a shards blockchain network. In this article, we concentrate on the blockchain network and follow a consensus protocol on security deposits to explore the issue of how to reconcile the economic reward and incentive. The knowledge asymmetric dilemma between beacon and users is also posed by the intrinsic features of the blockchain, i.e. transparency and decentralization. The philosophy of the contract is used to describe the dilemma. The optimum incentives for the various types of validators as well as the required deposits will also be obtained. The flexible deposits may provide ample economic stimulus for participants relative to fixed deposits without sacrificing the safety incentives. Moreover, the results of simulation suggest that the contract theory strategy will optimize the effectiveness of the beacon chain and fulfil the participants’ reward compatibility and individual rationality.