Blockchain-based traceability system adoption decision in the dual-channel perishable goods market under different pricing policies

Abstract

The blockchain-based traceability system (BTS) can reduce product losses in the perishable goods market, which yields a loss-reduction effect, and offer authentic information, which triggers a premium effect. In a dual-channel perishable goods supply chain (DPGSC), including one supplier and retailer each, the supplier can operate the price of the direct channel, different or non-different from that of the traditional channel. To study the adoption of BTS in the supplier-led DPGSC, we employed a game-theoretical model to capture BTS adoption strategy under the differential and non-differential pricing policies and proposed an improved cost-sharing contract to boost the DPGSC performance. The results indicated that both the supplier and the retailer are willing to improve product quality, broaden the saleable region, and lower the production cost. The adoption of BTS mainly depends on the losses-reduction effect, premium effect, production cost, and tag cost, which is affected more by the premium effect than by the loss-reduction effect. Furthermore, their adoption is not always easier when the production cost is higher. Except for symmetric base demands, they benefit asynchronously from BTS. Synchronised adoptions can be realised only when the improved cost-sharing contract generates more profits and introduces excess momentum. Highlights Blockchain-based traceability system handles product losses and forged information Adoption decision-making processes under two different pricing policies are studied In the adoption process, the premium effect outweighs the loss-reduction effect Contract may introduce insufficient momentum, excess momentum, or new inefficiency Once excess momentum is formed, supply chain members' adoptions become synchronised