Abstract

Despite the decisive contribution of intelligent transport systems in road safety, they also open new vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks, particularly vehicle position-linked attacks. For that reason, centralized systems are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the growth of the connected-vehicle fleets as it becomes more challenging to revoke certificates in real-time. We have proposed a new method that integrates a decentralized, collaborative system to meet these challenges. This method efficiently allows Blockchain integration for vehicular network’s cyber security by dynamically creating communities to revoke malicious vehicles in real-time. This article presents analytical models of the system of real-time revoking certificates and examines our solution’s impact on two important types of attacks in V2X communications, Sybil and the faking position attacks. Our experiments using real V2X hardware demonstrated the feasibility and benefits of real-time revocation via vehicle communities. The results were obtained from consensus implementation in a vehicular network comprising three communicating vehicles and a single roadside unit. In parallel, simulations showed feasibility in large-scale communications. As a result, the exposure and detection times of our solution meet real-time requirements.

Highlights

  • I N vehicular communications (V2X), there are promising technologies for solving intelligent transport system (ITS) problems such as accident prevention, traffic monitoring, and transport efficiency

  • Since temporary certificates are designed for non-traceability, it becomes almost impossible for vehicles to identify malicious pseudonyms or for the certificate authority (CA) to identify malicious behaviors

  • This contribution corresponds to the definition of an algorithm capable of building autonomous blockchain communities to evaluate their "goodness" and revoking malicious vehicles in real-time

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

I N vehicular communications (V2X), there are promising technologies for solving intelligent transport system (ITS) problems such as accident prevention, traffic monitoring, and transport efficiency. Since temporary certificates are designed for non-traceability, it becomes almost impossible for vehicles to identify malicious pseudonyms or for the certificate authority (CA) to identify malicious behaviors This vulnerability could cause two major types of cyberattacks linked to vehicles’ position: position-spoofing and the Sybil attacks. CERTIFICATE CHANGE STRATEGIES Privacy is considered one of the most critical issues in V2X communications While vehicles exchange their locations and identities, malicious nodes can track their information and threaten their privacy. Appropriate security schemes can be adopted, but this could cause additional latency [32] This is of utmost importance in emerging intelligent connectivity networks, leveraging cloud-based capabilities to support critical security services with stringent security, trust, and privacy requirements [17]. The ETSI survey [9] gives an overview of strategies used in existing projects standards

CERTIFICATE REVOCATION
POSITION-RELATED ATTACK DETECTION
COMMUNITY REVOCATION
CONSENSUS
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
SIMULATIONS
Findings
DISCUSSION
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
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