Abstract
The legislative process of assent laws at the federal level in Germany reveals a constitutional dilemma . The parties represented in the federal government and in the federal opposition sometimes use the Bundesrat to distinguish themselves politically for or against federal politics . The result is a pre-programmed embargo of the constitutional body . This instru- mentalization of the Bundesrat not only attracts political attention; in the literature, vari- ous approaches try to solve the phenomenon by constitutional law . Based on the limita- tions of German Basic Law, this article develops a new perspective on the problem: The existing coalition agreements of the federal states disregard the constitution and are there- fore unconstitutional . At the same time, the article critically examines the state of opinion and considers alternative clauses that respect the limits of the constitution .
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