Abstract
The aim of our study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is motivated by the value creation derived from monitoring, or by the informative advantage of the acquirers and insider trading. This would highlight the need of an strict application of Governance Codes and vigilance of firms with asymmetric information. Our results allow us to observe a purchase behaviour by either the control group, institutional investors or insiders when an improvement in managerial running is foreseen as a consequence of the higher monitoring the acquirers accomplish. Insiders show a higher probability of purchase in firms with more asymmetric information. asymmetric information
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