Abstract

In discussions of sub-Saharan Africa's relations with outside world, critiques suggesting that continent's elites are simply victims of structural pressures and hence bereft of responsibility for Africa's current predicament are common. (1) Colonialism, neocolonialism, debt, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and now globalization are all said to provide explanations for continent's plight, while its leaders have been tacitly exonerated (or have absolved themselves) from almost all blame. Although there are numerous books criticizing SAPs, most authors are silent as to why SAPs were introduced in first place--namely, gross malgovernace and imminent bankruptcy of many states on continent. (2) Attempts to rectify this state of affairs are often met with accusations of Afro-pessimism or worse. In doing so, such scholars effectively bolster positions of elites such as Obiang Nguema, president of Equatorial Guinea, in his complaint that is victim and not guilty party. Our continent has suffered because of its huge mineral resources ... we are being prevented from achieving our aims because of foreign meddling and interference in our African affairs. (3) The tendency to solely blame external factors for continent's predicament is, however, becoming less and less credible. This is not to say that external factors are irrelevant. Volatile commodity prices complicate economic policymaking and planning, and an unequal trading relationship helps to maintain Africa's marginalization, particularly with regard to subsidies and tariff and nontariff barriers in developed world. External political intrigue, more common during Cold War but still in evidence today, also has a pernicious effect on continent. (4) However, power relations between Africa and developed world can no longer simply be understood as top-down impositions from the West. Rather. African elites are themselves agents in--and arguably major causes of--the continent's demise. Indeed, although responsibility for continent's decline is often placed on such historical factors as collapse of commodity prices, those who advance such ideas have seemingly forgotten that by April 1970, Liberia and Somalia had already received seven stand-by agreement loans from IMF to help them address balance of payments and budgetary crises; Burundi had received five such loans; Ghana, Mali, and Rwanda four loans; Sierra Leone and Sudan three; and Congo/Zaire had completed its first IMF supervised devaluation. The granting of multiple stand-by agreements in less than a decade of independence suggests an almost immediate deterioration in management. (5) In other words, malgovernace and misrule were undermining Africa's development trajectory long before factors that are usually given as reasons for continent's demise were making themselves felt. Therefore, a critical evaluation of nature of state in Africa and behavior of its ruling elites is required if we are to gain realistic explanations for continent's denouement. The State in Africa Political power in Africa is less about capable administration and concomitant provision of broad-based benefits to populace and more about the giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from village level to highest reaches of central state. (6) The concept of neopatrimonialism captures this reality. (7) Remarkably, few studies of Africa's external relations recognize this feature of politics on continent, even though it must be starting point for any analysis; as a result, many analyses are marked by a certain naivete. Understanding how state in Africa really functions has critical implications for analyses of initiatives such as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). …

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