Blind Man, Mirror, and Fire: Aquinas, Avicenna, and Averroes on Thinking

Abstract

In Islamic tradition, the Falsafa school is well known for its naturalistic account of religion. When Falsafa’s theory of religion made its way to the Latin West, it was embraced and developed into the so-called “double truth theory” in Latin Averroism. However, this theory quickly lost its influence in the Latin tradition, primarily due to the critique by Thomas Aquinas. One of the key aspects of Aquinas’s critique is his criticism of the emanation theory of concepts and the doctrine of the unity of the intellect, which in turn undermines the foundation of Falsafa’s theory of religion, particularly their theory of natural prophecy. This paper aims to revisit the debate between Aquinas and Falsafa regarding the theory of intellect as the basis for natural prophecy, with a focus on highlighting Falsafa’s perspective. In particular, I examine how Aquinas’s arguments overlook the key insights that underpin Falsafa’s doctrine of the intellect.