Black Out-group Marriages and Hate Crime Rates: A Cross-sectional Analysis of U.S. Metropolitan Areas

Prior research has begun the task of assessing the applicability of group threat theory to explain sexual orientation hate crime. Drawing upon this perspective, researchers have hypothesized that relatively large and growing gay populations might be perceived as a threat to heterosexual norms, leading to sexual orientation hate crimes. Previous work has also identified an additional source of threat that may be particularly salient: threat to traditional marriage. Using data for a sample of metropolitan areas, we assess the impact of a previously unexamined potential source of threat: same-sex marriage. We also compare the relationships between the relative size and growth of the gay population and hate crimes expressed as incidence and victimization rates. The results reveal that the effects of the gay population’s relative size on incidence vs. victimization rates differ in important respects, and that the level of same-sex marriage is positively associated with both hate crime rates.

Much of the academic, practitioner and voluntary sector interest in victims of hate crime have focused upon the impacts of hate crime and the practical and emotional support needs and services for victims. Our own work has been somewhat divergent from this. We were commissioned to identify how hate crime reporting could be improved in a northern town, and made inclusive across different equality groups. We undertook a small scale study that examined individual decision making by hate crime victims in whether or not to report incidents, and how the available reporting arrangements and associated publicity materials affected these decisions (Wong & Christmann, 2008). Somewhat to our surprise, what appeared to be a critical issue in terms of whether or not hate crime policies were likely to succeed was also a much under researched area. Whilst our own research findings cannot be generalised beyond the study site, it did allow us to test out and consider more thoroughly some of the assumptions implicit in policy developments around hate crime reporting, specifically the policy goal of full reporting. We want to reflect back on these findings and the broader research literature to pose some questions on the adequacy and utility of the current reporting agencies approaches and the general policy direction to hate crime victims. We believe this has merit because the statutory criminal justice agencies and the voluntary sector are grappling with the challenges of adopting hate crime in its broadest sense, and providing a responsive, effective and victim centred service across markedly different vulnerable groups. Pertinent questions can be asked about what the current policies on hate crime can be expected to achieve given the nature of victim decision making on the critical issue of whether to report their victimisation. We will draw out some implications that the legacy of the Lawrence Inquiry has had for strategic thinking, policy making and make some tentative suggestions on how these might be improved. We argue something that may be considered heresy among hate crime victimloogy circles and victim campaigning groups; that the current policy message concerning victim reporting does not reflect reality, and risks being discredited. What is required, some 10 years post Lawrence is more nuanced responses and ones which acknowledge: the distance travelled by criminal justice agencies in the intervening years; that the majority of hate crime is manifested as single incidents of harassment (which may not necessarily constitute crimes); and the unlikelihood of full reporting by the public, which realistically fits where the public are in terms of their expectations. In doing so we do not pretend to have any authoritative answers to these issues, but believe the questions are worth posing to prompt a debate between efficacy of response versus a largely unchallenged view of hate crime victimology.

Hate crimes (or bias crimes) are crimes motivated by an offenders’ personal bias against a particular social group. Modern hate crimes legislation developed out of civil rights protections based on race, religion, and national origin; however, the acts that constitute a hate crime have expanded over time, as have the groups protected by hate crimes legislation. Anti-LGBT hate crimes, in which victims are targeted based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. LGBT people are highly overrepresented as victims of hate crimes given the number of LGBT people in the population, and this is especially true of hate crimes against transgender women. Despite the frequency of these crimes, the legal framework for addressing them varies widely across the United States. Many states do not have specific legislation that addresses anti-LGBT hate crimes, while others have legislation that mandates data collection on those crimes but does not enhance civil or criminal penalties for them, and some offer enhanced civil and/or criminal penalties. Even in states that do have legislation to address these types of hate crimes, some states only address hate crimes based on sexual orientation but not those based on gender identity. The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act gives the federal government the authority to prosecute those crimes regardless of jurisdiction; however, this power has been used in a limited capacity. Hate crimes are distinct from other crimes that are not motivated by bias. For example, thrill seeking, retaliation, or the desire to harm or punish members of a particular social group often motivates perpetrators of hate crimes; these motivations often result in hate crimes being more violent than other similar crimes. The difference in the motivation of offenders also has significant consequences for victims, both physically and mentally. Victims of hate crimes are more likely to require medical attention than victims of non-bias crimes. Likewise, victims of hate crimes, and especially anti-LGBT hate crimes, often experience negative psychological outcomes, such as PTSD, depression, or anxiety as a result of being victimized for being a member of an already marginalized social group.

Globally, there has been a trend in rising levels of hate crime that scholars have argued is reflective of significant social problems within society. Research into hate crime has typically focused on the police and their subsequent response to this crime type, with many findings reporting that the police are racist, homophobic and Islamophobic, to name but a few. However, existing research seldom captures the insights and experiences of sworn police officers, as much of the data is gathered from third parties. This paper presents the empirical findings from a Delphi study conducted with one police force in Australia, sampling sworn New South Wales (NSW) police officers between October 2020 and October 2021. The findings focus on four overarching areas: defining hate crime, perpetrators of hate crime, victims of hate crime, and responses to hate crime. These themes capture the perspectives of NSW police officers in relation to operational and organisational practice in respect of hate crime. Drawing on a Delphi method, the research outlines police perceptions of the nature of hate crime, as well as capturing how hate crime can be effectively reported, recorded, and responded to. Conclusions and implications are considered. These include the requirement for a clearer definition and targeted education strategies aimed at improving knowledge and understanding relating to hate crime. Future directions include the development of a standardised approach to reporting, recording, and responding to hate crime.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to highlight an urgent need for new and improved approaches to supporting hate crime victims and tackling hate crime perpetration in the light of escalating levels of hate crime and growing concerns over the effectiveness of existing interventions and support structures.Design/methodology/approachThe paper draws from the authors’ own extensive fieldwork conducted with more than 2,000 victims of hate crime over a series of recent studies. The research was designed to uncover lived experiences of hate crime, to understand the physical and emotional harms suffered by victims and their families, and to identify ways of improving the quality of support offered to victims.FindingsThe findings illustrate that current responses to hate crime are hampered by a range of perceived challenges and barriers to justice which exacerbate the harms associated with hate crimes. This includes low levels of public awareness of relevant policies, laws and support services, a lack of meaningful engagement between professionals and marginalised communities and a failure to provide victim-centred criminal justice interventions.Practical implicationsThis paper includes a number of recommendations in relation to how scholars, policy makers and professionals can overcome the failings that have been identified, which includes prioritising engagement with diverse communities, improving awareness of hate crime and generating a more comprehensive evidence base on hate crime perpetration.Originality/valueThese themes discussed within this paper are based upon the views and experiences of an extensive sample of hate crime victims, many of whom have never previously shared their stories with researchers, the police or any other support organisations.

The subject of the research is criminal law rules that provide for criminal liability for hate crimes and the judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on hate crimes. The purpose of the article is to confirm or refute the hypothesis that a unified approach to the definition of the legal concept of hate speech and the limits of its application is nec-essary. This approach must be based on the legal positions of the European Court of Hu-man Rights The research methodology includes analysis and interpretation of court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as a dialectical approach to the analysis of vari-ous points of view to the definition of extremist activity. The main results and scope of their application. The relevance of the research proposed for publication is due to the lack of uniform practice of applying the articles of the Russian Criminal Code on so-called "hate crimes" by Russian courts and the presence of signifi-cant contradictions in the positions of the European Court of Human Rights and the state position of the Russian Federation in defining key concepts in this area that are extremely important for criminal procedure and administrative activities. The paper considers scien-tific and practical attempts to define "hate crimes" in the global and regional human rights systems, basic recommendations of the UN on countering such crimes, and offers an interpretation of the term hate speech in relation to the related criminological concept of hate crime. The text provides statistical data describing the level of such crime and the practice of the ECHR in this area, mentions a list of criteria according to which "hate crimes" can be motivated by language differences, gender, sexual orientation and other characteristics, as well as criteria that distinguish hate speech from freedom of expres-sion, and suggests decriminalization of part 1 of article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code. Conclusions. It is necessary to unify the concepts of "hate crimes" (and the practice of their application) in the direction of, in particular, reducing the number of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights against the Russian Federation and increasing the level of legal protection of both the individual citizen of the Russian Federation and freedom of speech and expression.

The Hate Crimes Project in the United States, the expanded use of criminal legislation creating enhanced punishment for bias-motivated crimes, is now over twenty-five years old. Today, virtually every state expressly criminalizes bias crimes. Over this quarter century, states have employed different forms of bias crime laws, some focusing on the animus exhibited by the perpetrator of a crime against a member (actual or perceived) of a racial, ethnic, religious, or other included Group, others focusing on the perpetrator's discriminatory selection of his or her victim. Now is therefore a propitious time to begin to evaluate the societal gains and risks associated with bias crime, law enforcement. This paper sets out a framework from which to understand bias crime law, and then considers and addresses many of the issues raised by opponents of the bias crime program. The paper considers four issues in particular. First, opponents have argued that the enhanced punishment of bias crime calls greater attention to racial and ethnic differences in society, therefore exacerbating, not helping, social divisions. Second, those opposed to expanded prosecution for bias-motivated crimes have argued that the bias crime enforcement unconstitutionally, or in any event unwisely, punishes thought and expression, not criminal acts. Third, bias crimes opponents have argued that the potential for selective enforcement of bias crime statutes exists, harming the most disadvantaged members of society and ironically those whom bias crime laws are intended to help. Fourth, opponents question one of the prime justifications for the enhanced punishment of bias crimes - that these crimes cause a greater harm than similar crime without bias motivation - claiming that the bias motivation of the perpetrator per se is not the cause of the harm. Bias crimes per se, the argument goes, should not receive enhanced punishment, rather only crimes, any crimes, that cause these great harms. Finally, the paper offers some observations as to the most general challenge that may be asserted against bias crimes laws: the argument that these laws don't work, that is, that these laws do not prevent or even appreciably reduce levels of bias in society, or even levels of bias crimes. The paper argues that in some ways there is no real answer to this question of whether bias crime laws work but I further argue, in the classic words of the late Alexander Bickel, that no answer is what the wrong question begets. Instead of asking questions about reduction of certain types of crime or ever more so, certain types of social attitudes, we do better to ask whether bias crime laws punish that which society rightly condemns. Taking that path, we are led toward the implications of using bias crime law as a window into a society's self-perception as a multi-cultural society. The extent to which this will end bigotry in society will inevitably be an inquiry that is more aspirational than empirical.

Hate crimes, which stem from prejudiced attitudes, have a distributionally detrimental impact on societal stability. Although inter-group contacts are potentially an effective means for reducing prejudice and subsequently decreasing the number of hate crimes, scholars have recently recognized the possibility of negative contacts that might actually amplify prejudice. As a result, the question of whether intergroup contacts truly possess the ability to effectively decrease hate crime numbers remains inconclusive. In addition, prior contact research primarily relies on laboratory experiments because the establishment of intergroup contacts in a field setting is challenging. Examination of the effectiveness of intergroup contacts hence merits further investigation in a real-world setting. In this article, we propose that ride-hailing services, which naturally connect individuals from different backgrounds, offer an avenue to facilitate intergroup contacts in practice, which could potentially reduce prejudice and the volume of hate crimes. Leveraging the staggered introduction of this technology into counties in the United States, we conducted a series of analyses to empirically evaluate the contact effects in the open field. Our analysis reveals a notable decrease in the number of hate crimes (particularly a 5.75% reduction in racial hate crimes) after the introduction of ride-hailing services. These findings remained consistent across various robustness tests. Additional moderation analysis suggests that the increased interaction between different groups, facilitated by ride-hailing services, is the most likely explanation for the observed decrease in hate crimes. We further conducted an extensive survey involving real ride-hailing drivers and passengers. The results from our survey provide direct evidence that ride-hailing services create natural and constructive environments where positive interactions and mutual understanding can develop among diverse groups of people. This, in turn, helps mitigate prejudice and hate crimes within society, as observed in our analysis. This study not only extends the existing body of literature on contact theory but also sheds light on how modern technologies can play a pivotal role in curtailing hate crime, yielding both theoretical and practical implications.

Grounded in group conflict theory and the defended neighborhoods thesis, this nationwide empirical study of cities and their residential segregation levels examines the occurrence of hate crime using data for all U.S. cities with populations over 95,000 and Uniform Crime Reporting data for hate crime, in conjunction with 2000 census data. Hate crime is any illegal act motivated by pre-formed bias against, in this case, a person’s real or perceived race. This research asks: Do hate crime levels predict white/black segregation levels? How does hate crime predict different measures of white/black segregation? I use the dissimilarity index measure of segregation operationalized as a continuous, binary, and ordinal variable, to explore whether hate crime predicts segrega- tion of blacks from whites. In cities with higher rates of hate crime there was higher dissimilarity between whites and blacks, controlling for other factors. The segregation level was more likely to be “high” in a city where hate crime occurred. Blacks are continually multiply disadvantaged and distinctly affected by hate crime and residential segregation. Prior studies of residential segregation have focused almost exclusively on individual choice, residents’ lack of finances, or discriminatory actions that prevent racial minorities from moving, to explore the correlates of segregation. Notably absent from these studies are measures reflecting the level of hate crime occurring in cities. This study demonstrates the importance of considering hate crime and neighborhood conflict when contemplating the causes of residential segregation.

In this study, we examine if and how exposure to hate crimes is associated with the method of vote utilized by African American voters in the 2016 general election. Specifically, we are interested in how exposure to heightened levels of hate crimes at the county-level influences African Americans’ decision to vote-by-mail (VBM) as opposed to in-person (either early or election day voting). We examine the question using the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey and FBI county-level hate crime data (2013–2016). The FBI Uniform Crime Report hate crime dataset provides information on the physical location of the hate crime events. We merge the hate crime data with the CMPS data to examine if and how heightened rates of hate crime affect choice of voting mode. Consistent with expectations, we find that African Americans living in areas with higher levels of hate crimes are more likely to vote-by- mail rather than in person, potentially as a way to avoid the risk of encountering hate crimes.

Following the passage of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, hate crime research grew with the ability to use data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Nevertheless, limitations in the data collection led to a dramatic decline in research by the end of the 20th century. This review provides an overview on the development of the hate crime legislation and data collection in order to address and understand the prevalence of hate crimes in the United States. Despite the limitations found in the national hate crime data collected by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, a rise in the level of hate crimes against immigrants has renewed scholarly interest in identifying the causes and effects of hate crimes. Recent studies have taken a different approach to explain the rise in the level of hate crimes against immigrants given the passage of anti‐immigrant legislation and inflammatory rhetoric against immigrants. By examining the link between hate crimes against immigrant groups and the demographic, economic, and political changes within the local context, researchers can begin to explain the variation in hate crimes and inform future research as well as local policies and practices to prevent these crimes from occurring.

In recent years the European Union (EU) has witnessed rising levels of hate crime. However, although there have been a number of legislative and other policy initiatives introduced across the EU to combat such offences, these have developed in a piecemeal and sometimes half-hearted fashion. This article outlines the difficulties evident in theorizing hate crime and how these problems have been reflected in the divergent ways that hate crime legislation has developed across the EU. It argues that an approach to combating hate crime based on human rights, which is endorsed by many EU institutions, has failed to tackle the problem effectively and has resulted in the uneven protection of hate crime victim groups. By utilizing an individual rather than a group-based human rights approach, the damaging nature and effect of such ‘targeted victimization’ upon all hate crime victims can be better understood and addressed.

Future developments for hate crime thinking: who, what and why?, Neil Chakraborti Part One: Developing More Nuanced Understandings of Hate Crime 1. The more things change - post 9/11 trends in hate crime scholarship, Barbara Perry 2. The victimisation of Goths and the boundaries of hate crime, Jon Garland 3. Future challenges for hate crime policy: lessons from the past, Hannah Mason-Bish 4. Homophobic hate crime in Northern Ireland, Marian Duggan 5. Verbal and textual hostility in context, Nicole Asquith 6. Hate crime offenders, Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin, Jim Nolan and Susan Bennett Part Two: Developing More Nuanced Responses to Hate Crime 7. Law enforcement and hate crime: theoretical perspectives on the complexities of policing 'hatred', Nathan Hall 8. From hate to prevent: community safety and counter-terrorism, Derek McGhee 9. Hate crime victims and hate crime reporting: some impertinent questions, Kris Christmann and Kevin Wong 10. Racial aggravation or aggravating racism: overcoming the disjunction between legal and subjective realities, David Gadd 11. Healing harms and engendering tolerance: the promise of restorative justice for hate crime, Mark Walters and Carolyn Hoyle

Reviewed by: Tough on Hate?: The Cultural Politics of Hate Crimes by Clara S. Lewis Rebecca Barrett-Fox TOUGH ON HATE?: The Cultural Politics of Hate Crimes. By Clara S. Lewis. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 2013. Although gay college student Matthew Shepard’s murder was not legally deemed a hate crime, Shepard has become the paradigmatic hate crime victim, his image so often invoked that the federal legislation against hate crimes is named after him and lynching victim James Byrd, Jr. Though their murders raised national consciousness about bias-based violence, Clara S. Lewis argues in Tough on Hate?: The Cultural Politics of Hate Crimes, the media, politicians, and the general public have used their images in ways that paradoxically decry “hate” while undermining “our collective sense of culpability” (25) so that we cannot act on the ongoing structural oppression that incubates hate. Lewis posits that our well-meaning narratives about hate crimes demand a post-difference citizenship, “whereby members of historically marginalized groups and their allies are given access to public support by condoning post-difference ideology” (91). Victims of hate crimes (or their family members) must deny their difference, [End Page 142] which otherwise challenges ideas about national unity. Victims of anti–Arab/Muslim hate crimes must stress their love of America and Islam’s non-threatening nature. Racial minorities must be “race blind,” relegating race-based violence to the Civil Rights era (except in the exceptional case at hand). Victims of homophobic violence cannot be sexual but, like Shepard, childlike and from “spectacularly normal” backgrounds (96). Yet victims are selected precisely because they are not normative; their religious, ethnic, racial, and sexual identities place them outside of the norm. In a post-difference world, these identities don’t matter—except that they do, sometimes to the point of death. By erasing the very difference that inspired the crime, the public again victimizes with its “overwhelming desire to prove that we, the people within the community where the crime occurred, are better than the crime” (3). Hate crime narratives focus on the normality of the victim. (How tempting it is, as Matthew Shepard’s mother Judy speaks, to think, “That could have been my son!” Except that it wouldn’t ever be your son unless your son is gay). They also place the perpetrators outside of society, as “loners” on the “fringe.” The public’s desire to depict perpetrators, who are actually “disturbingly conformist” (85), as abnormal is motivated by the same need to view such crimes as abnormal rather than as “an expression of extended histories of often state-sponsored violence against minority groups and of broader contemporary social forces” (60). If victims really are different and perpetrators really are conformists, we could no longer see these crimes as unthinkable but as violent, predictable consequences of oppression. Lewis skillfully analyzes the rhetoric around hate crimes, examining news coverage, political hearings, legislation, and documentary films, and deploying theories from diverse disciplines in a way that will engage American Studies scholars. Unfortunately, it draws from a limited number of high-profile crimes—for example, no anti-Semitic crimes are examined. That said, it is easy enough for readers to imagine how the rich critiques that Lewis articulates here could be applied to other hate crimes and, more importantly, to our responses to them. Rebecca Barrett-Fox Arkansas State University Copyright © 2014 Mid-America American Studies Association

Hate crimes (e.g., anti-Asian and antisemitic) continue to be a problem in the United States. Federal laws protect specific groups (i.e., race, color, national origin, religion, gender/sex, gender identity, disability, and sexual orientation) from victimization of bias-motivated crimes. There is little research investigating how laypeople “know” whether a hate crime has occurred, as well as who they believe are hate crime offenders and victims. The current study explores laypeople's awareness and recognition of hate crimes, offenders, and victims that fit or do not fit their lay theories (e.g., stereotypes). More specifically, the study explores laypeople's (i.e., jurors’) lack of knowledge about federal hate crime legislation, offenders, and victims. The overarching research question is “What are people's lay beliefs about hate crimes, offenders, and victims?” A sample of jury-eligible participants was recruited through Prolific Academic. We conducted semi-structured interviews using quota sampling based on gender (men, women) and race (White, Asian, Black, Hispanic). We conducted a content analysis of the qualitative data. Results demonstrated that participants’ lay beliefs generally aligned with what federal law dictates; however, there were some non-protected groups that laypeople believed could still be victims of hate crimes. Additionally, results can inform researchers and policy makers about laypeople's beliefs about hate crimes, offenders, and victims, which can be applied broadly and to the context of juror decision-making. If laypeople's beliefs about hate crimes, offenders, and victims are inaccurate or do not align with the federal definition of hate crimes, they could subsequently make legally unsound and inaccurate decisions.