Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners' Rights

Abstract

Until the 1960s, the judiciary had taken a hands-off approach to issues related to the constitutional rights of prisoners. This absence of judicial scrutiny upon prison officials existed despite the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, which clearly implies that there are discernible limitations on the government's ability to punish convicted offenders. Cases filed by prisoners asserting the existence of constitutional protections were met by declarations that prisoners had forfeited all rights. Judges avoided deciding cases concerning prisoners by saying that convicted criminals were slave[s] of the state (Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 1871) or by deferring to correctional officials because of their supposed expertise in treating offenders (Robbins, 1980). According to Jacobs (1983, p. 35), the movement to gain judicial recognition of the existence of constitutional rights for prisoners in the 1960s was part of a larger societal transformation in which various political minorities, including women, ethnic groups, and disabled people, pressed for admission into the societal mainstream. Although other groups could use tactics such as public demonstrations, electoral participation, and legislative lobbying to increase their political power and societal acceptance, incarcerated offenders possessed very limited avenues for seeking redress of grievances. The tragedy at Attica state prison provides a vivid illustration of prisoners' complete inability to seek meaningful institutional reform through direct action (Wicker, 1975). Because prisoners lack access to alternative means of political participation, they must depend upon the courts for the recognition of constitutional protec-