Abstract
Rowhammer is a destructive software-induced DRAM fault, which an attacker can leverage to break system security. Both individual customers and enterprise users (e.g., cloud providers) might refrain from using a computing system if it is vulnerable to rowhammer vulnerability. In this paper, we provide the first end-to-end tool, coined BitMine, that systematically assesses a DRAM chip’s vulnerability to rowhammer bit flips. BitMine is an extension of DRAMDig. As DRAM address mappings are proprietary techniques and critical in inducing rowhammer bit flips, DRAMDig, our prior work, leverages domain knowledge to efficiently and deterministically reverse-engineer DRAM address mappings on Intel machines. By incorporating DRAMDig, BitMine configures three key parameters, i.e., hammer methods , hammer patterns , data patterns , on the effectiveness of finding rowhammer bit flips. BitMine by default implements 13 hammer methods, 4 hammer patterns and 16 data patterns and is extensible to support more. We evaluate DRAMDig and BitMine against multiple machine models that combine different DRAM chips and Intel microarchitectures. Our experiment results show that DRAMDig efficiently uncovers a deterministic DRAM address mapping for each machine model, and every implemented parameter in BitMine has its distinct effectiveness in triggering bit flips for different machine models.
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More From: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
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