Abstract

In this paper, we first define bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference(BNAI), derive its process-theoretic characterization and present a compositional verification method with respect to the main operators over communicating processes, generalizing in this way the similar trace-based results obtained in [19] into the finer notion of observation-based bisimulation [6]. Like its trace-based version, BNAI admits information flow between secrecy levels only through a downgrader (e.g. a cryptosystem), but is phrased into a generalization of observational equivalence [18]. We then describe an admissible interference-based method for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, extending, in a non-trivial way, the non interference-based approach presented in [11]. Confidentiality and authentication for cryptoprotocols are defined in terms of BNAI and their respective bisimulation-based proof methods are derived. Finally, as a significant illustration of the method, we consider simple case studies: the paradigmatic examples of the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [1] and the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol [25]. The original idea of this methodology is to prove that the intruder may interfere with the protocol only through selected channels considered as admissible when leading to harmless interference.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.