Biosecurity and dual-use research: gaining function - but at what cost?

Jonathan E Suk,Kathleen M Vogel,Amanda J Ozin

doi:10.3389/fpubh.2015.00013

Abstract

Biosecurity and dual-use research: gaining function - but at what cost?

Highlights

In September 2011, scientists announced new experimental findings that would threaten the conduct and publication of influenza research, but would have significant policy and intelligence implications
Regardless of where one finds oneself on the topic, it seems clear that advances in the life sciences are creating new ethical, safety, regulatory, and security challenges
To what extent such research should be conducted, published, and governed? Who should have a say in these outcomes? What viable alternatives exist? Since 2001, there have a variety of national and global initiatives to increase biosecurity, while not unduly inhibiting responsible scientific innovation

Summary

Introduction

In September 2011, scientists announced new experimental findings that would threaten the conduct and publication of influenza research, but would have significant policy and intelligence implications. The traditional “bottom up” approach of scientist self-governance for biosecurity is increasingly in question, but controversial changes to the National Science The debate and discussion over the dual-use implications of emerging infectious diseases and the life sciences continues and will continue in the foreseeable future.

Results

Conclusion