Biomedical Cognitive Enhancements: Coercion, Competition and Inducements

Abstract

Abstract There is an ongoing debate over the ethical permissibility of using biomedical enhancement interventions. This debate has generated a variety of concerns; one worry that stands out in this regard is the question of coercion. Curiously, although pointed out by many, this concern has not received close scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to begin addressing this conceptual gap. In order to explore this concern, I employ Alan Wertheimer’s understanding of coercion. According to Wertheimer’s account coercion involves a wrongful threat in which one has little choice but to succumb. Moreover, the wrongfulness of the threat stems from the fact that it violates the coercee’s rights. I suggest that if one accepts this account, it follows that coercing people to enhance would be impermissible. Using this framework, the paper assesses the claim that competition over jobs, goods, and positions coerces people to enhance. I argue, however, that competition pursued within a proper legal framework cannot be coercive since it neither involves a wrongful threat nor violates a person’s rights. Nonetheless, I propose that although competition is not coercive, enhancing because of competitive pressure can be morally problematic as it could restrict personal autonomy and harm well-being. The paper explores strategies the State could devise in order to address both these concerns. The paper then examines whether there are noncoercive permissible ways to induce people to cognitively enhance. Using a number of hypothetical cases, I delineate criteria that could be used to determine whether a particular enhancement should be considered mandatory or otherwise encouraged. Specifically, I consider the circumstances under which it would be justified to use incentives and penalties in order to induce people to enhance.