Biology and Religion: On Establishing a Problematic1

Abstract

In an article on Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works, Steve Jones opines that for most scientists, is to science as pornogra phy is to sex: is cheaper, easier, and some people seem, bafflingly, to prefer it (1997: 13-14). The sort of philosophy to which Jones refers is the interpretation of nature metaphysical terms Jones 1997: 13), an enterprise warned against in the motto of the Royal Society of London, JVullius in verba, trust not in words Jones 1997: 13). But while we might incline to the Royal Society's aversion to meta physical conjectures, we would do well not to conflate such conjec tures with philosophical concerns and reflections of an epistemologi cal and analytical sort. Philosophical concerns of an epistemological and analytical sort are of importance for establishing a problematic in the study of biol ogy and religion. Such concerns can be expressed in the form of questions such as these: What do we want to know? Why do we want to know those things? And what sorts of constraints might affect our understandings? The study of biology and religion implicates at least two interests: an interest in religion and, more broadly, an interest in the human condition, particularly as that condition may be illuminated by theo rizing about evolutionary developments and human nature. But while establishing a problematic embraces both interests, different scholars are guided by different agendas and emphases. In some cases, primary emphasis is directed to religion as explanandum, the thing to be explained or to be better understood. In other cases, consideration of religion is largely instrumental or illustrative.