Biography and Theory Reconsidered: Second Wittgensteinian Thoughts

Abstract

In an article published last year, (1) I argued that biography offered, or should offer if done properly, a paradigm example of Wittgenstein's notion of 'the understanding that consists in seeing connections' (Philosophical Investigations, Part I, paragraph 122), a type of understanding that Wittgenstein identified as his goal in philosophy and which , crucially, is non-theoretical. Biography, I maintained, is a perfect exemplar of this kind of understanding and, as such, it is fundamentally mistaken, either to search for a of biography or to read or write biography as if it were in any way a theoretical enterprise. I developed this view through a four-pronged assault: 1. a survey of the scholarly, but non-academic literature on biography from Dr Johnson to the early twentieth century, seeking to identify the forces that pulled it in the direction of theory; (2) 2. an examination of the work of those biographers who have approached their task in a consciously theoretical manner; 3. a critical engagement with the recent theoretical literature about biography; and 4. an application to biography of Wittgenstein's non-theoretical notion of philosophical understanding. I want in this present essay to respond to a difficulty in my argument that centres on the notion of 'theory' as that notion is variously understood by (a) Wittgenstein, (b) some theorists and (c) the general public. At the heart of the difficulty is the thought that Wittgenstein and I may be using the word 'theory' in an artificially and illegitimately narrow way that is not in conformity with its normal usage. This thought, as it applies to Wittgenstein (but not in connection with either my work or biography), has been explored in some depth and with no little subtlety by the late Oswald Hanfling in his article 'The Use of in Philosophy'. (3) Hanfling begins by noting a strong connection in Wittgenstein's work between his insistence that philosophy is non-theoretical and his equally fervent insistence that philosophy is not a science. Philosophical Investigations Part I, paragraph 109, which contains his famous and oft-quoted remarks about ('And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place') begins: 'It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific one', an allusion, Hanfling persuasively suggests, to Tractatus 4.111: 'Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences'. Does Wittgenstein think that saying that philosophy is not a theoretical discipline is the same thing as saying that it is not a science? Does he think, in other words, that scientific theories are the only kind? Well, it certainly seems to be true that the words he uses to characterise theories are those most commonly associated with science. As Hanfling puts it: A theory, as indicated in those passages [Philosophical Investigations [section]109, 126] is put forward with the purpose of explaining as opposed to describing, and the explaining is done by reference to something that is hidden, as opposed to lying open to view. Such theories may be hypothetical, and the problems with which they deal are empirical ones. (4) What is being described here, surely, is, first and foremost a scientific theory. When characterising Wittgenstein's use of the word 'theory' in Philosophical Investigations, however, it is worth bearing in mind that the available sample is very small. In fact, paragraph 109 is the only place in the entire book in which the word occurs. It is nonetheless a crucial word. Elsewhere in Wittgenstein's work, it is possible to find several instances of the word being used to describe what Wittgenstein is not doing. For instance: 'What we do is the opposite of theorizing. Theory blinds' (MS 133, 1946-47), 'What we are not looking for is a 'philosophical theory (MS130, 1946), and, when his discussions with the Vienna Circle touched on the subject of ethics and the attempt to understand the notion of moral value, he remarked: If I were told anything that was a theory, I would say, No, no! …