Abstract
Bioethics, as an emergent model of an interdependent ethic, has paid increasing attention to casuistry, or case-based reasoning, to resolve its value-laden issues. A case study supports attention to casuistry, but notes its limitations in contemporary bioethical discourse. Casuistry suffers from its connections to Aristotelian phronesis, whose assumptions regarding experiential wisdom weaken its moral force. A “new” prudence exploits several narratively-informed dialogical virtues as argumentation tools in the service of bioethical deliberation. These virtues strengthen critical thinking and contribute to morally justified decisions through self scrutiny, moral imagination, and prudential listening patterns.
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