Abstract

The overall research question addresses the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms in poli -cies that enhance private forest owners’ biodiversity protection. In particular, the paper focuses on the link between forest owners’ motivations, incentives, and institutions, and questions the incentives of the current biodiversity protection policies. Our hypothesis is that the purely monetary nature of the incentives can cause a “crowding out effect”, i.e., forest owners may reduce their voluntary contribution to biodiversity protection that is driven by prosocial motivations (altruism, self-image, etc.). With this in mind, as well as the knowledge acquired via this project about forest owners’ motivations, we looked for the most effective combinations of “incentive mechanisms” (monetary and non-monetary) and “institutions” (national and local authorities, NGOs, etc.) to encourage forest owners to adopt biodiversity protection measures in their forests.

Highlights

  • In this paper we empirically analyze designs of voluntary biodiversity protection schemes

  • Our research is based on a survey of private forest owners in France consisting of a discrete choice experiment, in line with [1]

  • The present study has shown that institutional factors are very important for forest owners’ commitments to biodiversity protection in their forest

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Summary

Introduction

In this paper we empirically analyze designs of voluntary biodiversity protection schemes. We investigate whether or not institutions, prosocial behavior, and potential crowding out may influence participation in protection schemes. Biodiversity is central to forest ecosystem services and there is still a great need to implement better management and practices, especially in forests and outside protected areas [3]. In [4], the authors observed that monetary tools are the most frequently used solution in a review of studies on Mediterranean agroecosystems. They argue that social and biophysical attributes are important as well when considering cases in which farmers have to be incentivized to supply ecosystem services. In [5], the authors reported that the main constraints that impede an effective monitoring of biodiversity in Greece are institutional and political

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