Biclique cryptanalysis of MIBS‐80 and PRESENT‐80 block ciphers

Abstract

AbstractPRESENT and MIBS are two lightweight block ciphers that are suitable for low resource devices such as radio‐frequency identification tags. In this paper, we present the first biclique cryptanalysis of MIBS block cipher and a new biclique cryptanalysis of PRESENT block cipher. These attacks are performed on full‐round MIBS‐80 and full‐round PRESENT‐80. Using matching without matrix technique in the attack on MIBS and choosing a sub‐key space of an internal round for key division eventuate to reduce the security of this cipher by 1bit, while the data complexity of attack is 252 chosen plaintext. The attack on PRESENT‐80 has a data complexity of at most 222 chosen plaintext and computational complexity of 279.34 encryption that both complexities are lower than of other cryptanalyses of full‐round PRESENT‐80 so far. Also, in this paper, we use early abort technique to efficiently filter out wrong keys in matching phase of biclique attack of PRESENT‐80. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.