Bicameralism in Stable Democracies

Abstract

Bicameralism refers to legislative systems that include two chambers. In presidential systems, both chambers are typically directly elected. In parliamentary systems, the first (or lower) chamber is directly elected while the second (or upper) chamber can be appointed, elected directly, or elected indirectly. Historically, bicameral legislatures intended to represent the interest of the aristocracy in the second chamber and the interests of landowners in the first chamber, ensuring that aristocratic interests were dominant by granting the second chamber strong veto authority (i.e., the power to defeat bills) over all legislation. As universal suffrage spread, however, the ability of unelected second chambers to dictate policy to popularly elected governments in the first chamber became untenable. To address this anomaly, governments responded by either (1) abolishing the second chamber, (2) utilizing the second chamber as a venue to represent the subunits within federal states (e.g., states, provinces, etc.), or (3) granting the second chamber a role in policy refinement (i.e., improving legislation), while at the same time replacing the power to defeat legislation outright with the power to delay legislation (suspensory veto authority). Although most second chambers play a role in refining legislation, the legislative studies literature has historically focused on second chambers within federal systems (which typically possess strong veto authority) and have ignored the policy influence of second chambers that lack strong veto authority. This “conventional wisdom” is being challenged, as governments have become increasingly reliant on second chambers as venues to introduce and debate legislation and have had to become more adept at negotiating with second chambers, as the latter have become increasingly more willing to defeat government legislation in many legislative systems. This debate has also found its way into political discourse as several governments debate reform, which would balance the ability of elected government majorities in the first chamber to pass their legislative agenda while protecting crucial policy refinement functions and expertise found in the second chamber. While the idea of abolishing the second chamber is sometimes raised by political parties that are underrepresented in the second chamber, in most advanced industrial democracies, modern institutional debates focus on reform rather than abolition of the second chamber.