Abstract
Access and usage externalities affect consumer welfare and behavior in regulated communications networks, but nobody has ever adjusted prices to allow for externalities with a binding revenue constraint. If we fail to account for network externalities when we set (profit-constrained) welfare-maximizing access and usage prices, are the resulting prices too high or too low? This article demonstrates that the outcome depends upon what size of customer is likely to exit the network. It determines ranges where the access price increases and the usage price decreases, as well as the reverse.
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