Beyond world history: On Hegel's and Kierkegaard's interests in ethics and religion

Abstract

What was wrong with Hegel's philosophy of world history? Why did Kierkegaard consider it to be 'charmant', 1 sure, but without any ethical relevance, whereas Hegel considered world history to have an eminent ethical and even religious significance. The point I want to show is that Kierkegaard's critical position over against the Hegelian conception of world history has something to do with what I would call a loss of substance. I will argue that for Kierkegaard 'det Bestaaende', the actual social and political world, has lost its substantial character. His ethical and religious thought must be considered as an attempt to compensate for this loss of substance and to offer an alternative for Hegelianism in an age that cannot believe anymore in the reasonableness of world history. In Hegel's system world history plays a crucial role in the transition from the ethical to the religious sphere. On the one hand it remains in the sphere of finiteness; on the other hand it refers to the absolute without presenting it as such. Being only the manifestation of the absolute spirit, not absolute spirit as it is in itself, it presents its power, its presence in the world. The presentation of the absolute as such, in its absoluteness, remains the specific task of art, religion and philosophy. From a religious point of view Hegel considered world history to be the product of God's Providence, As a philosopher he translated this religious belief into the philosophical thesis that reason governs the world (Ph R §343 A; E §549 A). World history thus forms a link between the ethical and the religious spheres of life. The specific task of the philosophy of world history is to show this link and, by showing it, to complete it. Thanks to the philosophical exposition of the course of world history, reason in history is no longer just there objectively; it is also there subjectively, for self-consciousness. This unity of (objective)life and (subjective) knowledge is nothing but the definition of the absolute idea itself, which is the true and only subject of art, religion and philosophy. Kierkegaard's, and more particularly Johannes Climacus' ambition was to show that Hegel's interest in world history must be unmasked as an aesthetical interest. According to Climacus Hegel's tendency to consider world history as the culmination point of ethical life simply ends in ethical quietism. The main objection indeed, Climacus raises against the Hegelian system in general and his philosophy of world history in particular is that it ignores ethics (AE 9, 102-3; 10, 14 nl; 10, 16-7). 2 According to Climacus, ethics has everything to do with existence, i.e. with acting and becoming, and therefore, with the future, whereas the philosophy of world history is about the past. Therefore Hegel's interest in world history must be considered as a theoretical interest; not as an ethical or a practical one. And since all interest in theoretical and objective knowledge *Leuzestraat 8, B-8510 Bellegem, Belgium.