Abstract
This essay evaluates the philosophical merits of the Pratyabhijñā Śaiva critique of Dharmakīrti's stance that the judgment of sameness that constitutes a concept formed via exclusion (apoha) does not require ultimate grounding, and presents these Śaivas' account of the relationship between time, reality, and concepts. These Śaivas argue that time is the expression, as the subject/object pairs that define conventional worlds, of the non-dual differentiation inherent in ultimate reality—and use Dharmakīrti's own apoha theory to explain how this works.
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