Beyond the Self-Referential Critique of Determinism

Abstract

BEYOND THE SELF-REFERENTIAL CRITIQUE OF DETERMINISM Introduction DURING THE PAST FIFTY YEARS or so, determinism has been frequently under critical fire from what today is typically styled the "self-referential ~~rgument." The argument is so styled because it purports to show that determinism must be rejected, not because it fails to meet the challenge of. an opposing theory, but rather and more trenchantly because it is intrinsically self-refuting by dint of self-contradiction: to wit, any attempt to vindicate determinism is eo ipso a vindication of indeterminism. A salient feature of the self-referential argument is that it deviates from the normal critical procedure whereby one questions the legitimacy of the evidence adduced in support of a theory. In fact, the argument alerts us to the fundamental assumption of this procedure, namely, that the proponent of a given theory can appeal to supporting evidence, even if it turns out that the proponent's appeal, at least insofar as the critic is concerned, is unconvincing. It is this fundamental assumption that the argument contests. For implicit in the argument is the radical contention that the determinist hypothesis cannot invoke evidence in its own behalf. Shortly, I shall endeavor to show that this radical contention of the self-referential argument-that determinism cannot cite supporting evidence-harbors a hitherto undisclosed and even more devastating critique of determinism than that of the selfreferential argument itself: nothing less than that determinism is a meaningless theory, and hence actually no theory at all. However, since the claim as to determinism's ultimate mean74 THE SELF-REFERENTIAL CRITIQUE OF DETERMINISM 75 inglessness is legitimized in consequence of the self-referential argument, the justification of such a claim evidently presupposes the justification of this argument. For this reason, it will be necessary to defend the argument's radical contention, that determinism cannot cite supporting evidence, before proceeding to argue that determinism's theoretic meaninglessness is implicit in and thus inferable from this very contention. "The Self-Referential Argument" Determinism, we know, amounts essentially to the theory that one's actions cannot issue from choices based on a deliberative weighing of the options. Choices, determinists insist, are all of them conditioned and motivated by antecedent hereditary and/or environmental factors, factors which causally necessitate our every thought, word and deed.1 Now the determinist cannot but regard the determinist theory as true. If so, we are naturally driven to inquire into the probative basis of this theory. What might this be? It will hardly do merely to assert or stipulate the truth of determinism , since, of course, what is merely asserted is arbitrarily asserted, and what is arbitrarily asserted may be merely arbitrarily denied. Presumably then the determinist, if he wishes to convince, must cite evidence, e.g., the scientific principle that all events are necessarily caused, in behalf of his determinist theory. That is, the determinist must needs contend that the 1 This description of determinism is equally applicable to both the "hard determinist" camp-the view that determinism precludes moral freedom and therefore moral responsibility-and the "soft determinist" camp-the view that determinism is compatible with moral freedom and therefore with moral responsibility. For a brief discussion of these two positions, see Arthur J. Minton, "Theories About Human Freedom," in Philosophy & Sci· ence, ed. Frederick E. Mosedale (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 119· 123. For a somewhat more developed discussion of these views, see W. T. Stace's defense of soft determinism, "The Problem of Free Will," in Philosophy & Contemporary lss'ues, eds. John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 19-26, and Robert Blatchford's defense of hard determinism, "The Delusion of Free Will," ibid,., pp. 27-34. 76 JOSEPH A. MAGNO evidence supportive of determinism is rationally more compelling than the evidence critical of determinism. Clearly, though, such a contention, whereby the determinist essays to convince, makes sense only on the supposition that one can deliberate on the evidence, and so find the evidence for determinism more compelling than the evidence against determinism. In short, such a contention makes sense only on the supposition that one is free, since free will theory or indeterminism , in contradistinction to...