Beyond the Personal OmniGod

Abstract

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to motivate a search for a viable alternative to the standard analytic philosophers’ conception of God as the personal omniGod—that is, a personal being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. It is argued that reasonable doubts may be raised especially about the religious adequacy of this standard conception. Taking God to be a supreme personal being arguably leaves us with an inadequate account of divine transcendence and immanence. This claim is bolstered by an appeal to an apophatic understanding of the classical doctrine of divine simplicity. It is argued, furthermore, that a ‘right relationship’ version of a (‘normatively relativized’) ‘logical’ Argument from Evil is successful, even considering what a personal God may be able to do in the hereafter to ‘defeat’ horrendous evils (as proposed in sophisticated speculative theodicies of the sort offered by Marilyn Adams). Relative to certain normative commitments that it seems reasonable to hold, a personal God with ultimate control over a creation marred by horrendous evils could not be regarded as perfectly good (and hence could not be regarded as having the perfect worth required to be the true object of worship). Outright atheism need not follow, however, since there may be a different and better understanding of the theist God which it is reasonable to judge as religiously adequate.