Abstract
The last two decades have witnessed a wide-ranging and global discussion of the theory and structure of human and constitutional rights. This debate initially focused on the principle of proportionality and subsequently on the related ideas of the ‘culture of justification’ and the ‘right to justification.’ There is now a far-reaching agreement that both proportionality and justification in human and constitutional rights law are concerned with the reasonableness, alternatively the justification in terms of public reason, of the act under consideration. Thus, reasonableness and/or public reason have assumed a, perhaps the, central place in the theory of human and constitutional rights.
Highlights
The last two decades have witnessed a wide-ranging and global discussion of the theory and structure of human and constitutional rights
I will argue that the moral core of human and constitutional rights consists of a commitment not to reasonableness or public reason but to human dignity and its three sub-principles of intrinsic value, moral autonomy, and fundamental equality
The idea of equal concern reappeared as the principle of intrinsic value and the idea of equal respect became the principle of personal responsibility
Summary
The last two decades have witnessed a wide-ranging and global discussion of the theory and structure of human and constitutional rights. This debate initially focused on the principle of proportionality and subsequently on the related ideas of the ‘culture of justification’ and the ‘right to justification.’. Reasonableness has its place in the theory of rights, but it is more peripheral: human and constitutional rights insist that policies and acts be reasonably justifiable under the dignitarian structure which lies at their core. Möller dignitarian structure of rights provides a deeper and more attractive account of the culture of justification and the right to justification
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