Beyond musical qualia. Reflecting on the concept of experience.

Abstract

How is it that a diminished seventh chord played on a piano, or an open E string plucked on a guitar, give rise to the experiences they do? How can we explain the feeling closure evoked by a cadence in tonal music? Answers to questions like these have been sought in association with the notion quale. In its original usage, the term qualia (the plural form quale) refers to the intrinsic qualities the subjective experience associated with a given sensory event (Jackson, 1982). But its usage in current research has come to describe subjective experience more broadly (Haugeland, 1985; Nagel, 1974), including musical varieties (see Huron, 2006; Zentner, 2012). For the latter, it is common to refer to musical qualia (Dowling, 2010; Goguen, 2004). In this paper, we take a critical look at three standard notions qualia (in general) and musical qualia (in particular). Although our main goal is to contribute to a richer understanding what musical experience entails, we draw from the broader context cognitive science, philosophy mind, and Gestalt psychology, presenting arguments that go beyond the sole domain music. Indeed, because music spans such a wide range human activity, it offers a rich experiential context where theories cognition may be put to the test. For this reason, our musically oriented discussion may have implications for assessing the validity the notion qualia in general.We begin by considering three main philosophical perspectives on qualia. Here we critically discuss their explanatory power using examples drawn from musical contexts. Following this we examine the alternative proposals Daniel Dennett (1979, 1988), and Diana Raffman (1993), respectively. As we discuss, both thinkers deliver compelling eliminativist approaches to the notion qualia, with Raffman offering a critical extension Dennett's position using musical experience as a paradigmatic example. Although these two approaches are certainly fascinating, we suggest they are also problematic, as they rely on models the mind that provide only limited accounts what musical experience entails. In response to this, and the three main perspectives on qualia previously discussed, we then explore another possibility, drawing on the notion body (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Jonas, 1966; Merleau-Ponty, 1945), research in Gestalt psychology, and the enactive framework to cognition originally developed by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991; see also Thompson, 2007; Stewart, Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010). Here we suggest a richer, relational, and more holistic model music cognition that embraces the way people actually engage with and talk music in the course their lived experience. We also explore how this approach impacts the concept qualia and consider its relevance for musical research and practice. Before embarking on this, however, let us start with a brief discussion over the three most common perspectives on the notion qualia to clarify their significance for musical research.Three Perspectives on QualiaThe three most common approaches to the study qualia can be summarized as follows:(a) the nonintentional, nonrepresentationalist view (NINR)(b) the intentional, representationalist view (IR), and(c) the intentional, nonrepresentationalist view (INR)The first option (NINR) is probably the most pervasive one. It has been described in terms a quartet attributes, where qualia are understood as ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly apprehensible [but not directly describable] in consciousness (see Dennett, 1988). In this view, qualia are not explicitly of or something (which means-in classical phenomenological terms-they are nonintentional1). They are, rather, just phenomenal properties present in the perceiver. As an example, consider the sensation being depressed. This feeling is not literally about something. …