Beyond Duty and Virtue in Design Ethics

Abstract

Introduction An important issue concerning design ethics is the nature of the moral character of the designer.1 Ethics in the disciplines of design has essentially been articulated around notions of duty and virtue,2 which correspond broadly to Kantian and Aristotelian views respectively.3 These in turn belong to two general conceptions of ethics, namely imperative and attractive moralities.4 The imperative view refers to the principles of duty and universal law achieved through reason and to which one must obey in all circumstances. This is, for instance, what Kant calls the categorical imperative. Most professional codes of ethics and practice in design disciplines belong to that tradition. Virtue ethics is the practice of one’s virtues that leads to the perfection of moral character, which implies that the character of the individual is somehow a fixed attribute or an objective feature.5 It is in opposition to these conventional conceptions of the imperative principle of duty and universal law, on the one hand, and of virtue ethics which treats a person’s character as a collection of objective facts, on the other hand, that Sartre’s view of human freedom and ethics has to be seized as a possible foundation for design ethics. Indeed, Sartre provides a radically different perspective on the nature of human character. A conception of design ethics based on a Sartrean existentialist conception of human reality may offer a particularly enlightening and useful perspective on the nature of the moral character of the designer and therefore a ground for design ethics. In a Sartrean perspective, cause and motive6 (reason and emotion) cannot provide a definitive basis for the action of the individual in the pursuit and justification of moral duty or moral virtue. Cause and motive are to be placed in relation to a much more basic reality, namely the freedom of the individual. Indeed, the designer confronting a moral choice is free to choose, and by making a free choice he/she is creating his/her existence.7 According to Sartre, the ”authenticity” with which the individual faces his/her freedom is the primary criterion for judging actions as ethically good or bad. Thus, if the designer’s moral character (i.e., authenticity) has meaning in a Sartrean perspective, it is to be found not in instrumental reason but in being reflectively conscious of his/her human condition and acknowledging and accepting his/her freedom. For