Beyond Duty and Virtue in Design Ethics

Of late philosophers have begun to write about the implications of research in social and personality psychology for the study of ethics. The spirit of this movement is that ethics should be founded on a realistic conception of human nature and that social and personality psychology have important things to say about these matters. Examples of philosophers involved in this movement are, inter alia, and most prominently, Doris, Flanagan, Harman, and Vranas. On the psychologists’ side, Ross and Nisbett are the most prominent examples of those attempting to insure that the findings of psychology find their way into our conception of human nature. We want to sign up for this movement too. But we are afraid that these philosophers and psychologists have drawn wrong conclusions from psychological results. We believe the lesson to be learned is substantially narrower than the movement seems to believe.

THE GOOD WILL ACCORDING TO GERALD ODONIS, DUNS SCOTUS, AND WILLIAM OF OCKHAM The role of emotions in morality has long been a bone of contention between Kant's defenders and his critics. His critics insist that emotional inclinations and responses do have moral significance. They are not merely passions beyond our control; they are integral to our values and hence reflective of our moral character. Recent advocates of virtue theory, rallying under the banner of Aristotle, have joined in pouring scorn on Kant. Bystanders are sometimes invited to choose sides: Will we have an ethics of virtue, where our emotions can be cultivated, educated, and given a positive role in our moral lives, or will we have the good will ethic, where emotions can neither increase nor diminish our moral worth?1 In truth, we can have both. We can have an ethics of virtue where all moral goodness depends on the will. We need not choose between Aristotle and Kant, though we might well have to choose between competing medieval theories. While all are ethics ofvirtue, not all endorse Aristotle's conception of virtue. Whether emotional inclinations and responses have moral significance is open to debate. That very question occasioned considerable controversy in the later Middle Ages. The controversy may go unnoticed because much of it lies buried under a discouraging rubric: the location of the virtues .2 But let us not be discouraged. The location of the virtues is less *I am indebted to Professors James J. Walsh and Paul O. Kristeller for helpful comments on drafts of this study. 1 See, for example, Philippa Foot, "Virtues and Vices," Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) 12-14; Lawrence J. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge, 1980) 204-5. 2 More specifically, the usual question is: "Whether the moral virtues I20BONNIE KENT a problem of where virtue is than of what virtue is—of what it is to be a virtuous man. When a medieval tells üs where virtues are found, he tells us a good deal about his conception of human goodness. As we know, St. Thomas taught that justice lies in the will; temperance and courage lie rather in the sense appetite.3 At least some virtues must be posited in the seat of the passions because the proper emotional responses are deemed essential to human goodness. According to Thomas, the passions ofthe sense appetite can be brought into habitual conformity with reason, and when they are, they make a man better than he would be otherwise.4 Unlike Thomas, many Franciscans attributed all moral virtues to the will. Some granted that the sense appetite could acquire habits or inclinations resembling virtues, but those who did usually denied that such qualities are essential to virtue.5 Others declined to award even quasi-virtues to the sense appetite.6 On one broad point most are in the will as in a subject," or "Whether the moral virtues are in the sense appetite as in a subject." Sometimes the stated question is specific to the cardinal virtues, though the author will ordinarily draw conclusions about moral virtues in general. In commentaries on the Sentences, the location of the virtues is usually discussed in Book III, dist. 33. 3 Aquinas, Summa Theol., I—II, q. 56, a. 4-6; q. 59, a. 4; q. 60, a. 2; lili , q. 58, a. 9. 4 Aquinas, Summa Theol., I—II, q. 24, a. 3; q. 50, a. 3. 5 Bonav., Sent., lib. Ill, d. 33, a. un., q. 3 (ed. Quaracchi, III, 717; Ricardus de Mediavilla, Sent, lib. Ill, d. 33, a. 1, q. 1 (ed. Brescia 1591, III, 371; Frankfurt: Minerva, 1963); Scotus, Opus Oxon., lib. Ill, d. 33, q. un. (ed. Vives, XV, 448, 455); Franciscus de Mayronis, Sent., lib. Ill, d. 33, q. 2, a. 3 (ed. Venetiis 1520, f. 173rb; Frankfurt: Minerva, 1966); Ockham, Quaest. in III Sent., q. 11 (OTh VI, 358-62). Scholastic treatments of the location of the virtues are reviewed in Thomas Graf, De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum (Romae: Herder, 1935), vol. 1, pt. 2. For excerpts from Franciscan writings, see especially 144-8 (Peter...

The image of schools in Thailand is influenced by their administrators’ role on social responsibility in terms of morality, integrity and professional code of ethics. An important mechanism for educational reform in line with government’s goals is to instill those administrators with behaviors in ensuring good-governance-based school administration. This qualitative research employs in-depth interview as the research tool, while the data are analyzed using content analysis technique. Moreover, the data are collected from 10 key informants, who are selected by means of purposive sampling. They are divided into 2 groups: 1) 2 officials of the Secretariat Office of the Teachers Council of Thailand holding position of director or higher; and 2) 4 educational administrators and 4 school administrators. The aims to propose two issues: 1) To study and develop morality, integrity and professional code of ethics of school administrators in Thailand; and 2) To propose directions for development of social responsibility components in terms of morality, integrity and professional code of ethics of school administrators in Thailand. This enhances also teachers and students’ adherence to morality, integrity and social responsibility. Components of social responsibility in terms of morality, integrity and professional code of ethics of school administrators should be integrated by Thai Agencies responsible for school administrator development into benchmark of school administrator appointment, school administrator development or promotion of acceptance among schools’ clients, communities and stakeholders. The application of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to main policy of school administration is the significant mission to be concretely executed because it creates framework of schools’ direct and indirect responsibility towards stakeholders’ lifestyle and relevant environmental settings. The development of school administrators’ social responsibility in terms of morality, integrity and professional code of ethics will generate a body of knowledge that leads to action. Indeed, 4 components of social responsibility are: ‘Advantage Focus’, ‘Individual Factor’, ‘Virtue Ethics’ and ‘Just Professional’. All these promote school administrators’ morality, integrity and ability to efficiently work under framework of professional code of ethics. They will eventually become good role model for their colleagues, subordinates and related persons. This agrees with current instructional approach that focuses on solutions to problem owing to the lack of morality and integrity development. School administrators play an important role in reflecting their true social responsibility. Keywords: Moral and Ethics, Integrity, Professional Code of Ethics, Social Responsibility, School Administrators

The Thomist 70 (2006): 237-65 IS AQUINAS AN ACT-ETHICIST OR AN AGENT-ETHICIST? DAVID A. HORNER Bio/a University La Mirada, California ONE OF THE STANDARD WAYS of construing a (or the) basic distinction between virtue theories and nonvirtue theories in ethics is as a distinction between agent-ethics and act-ethics.1 Twelve years before Elizabeth Anscombe's landmark 1958 article on "Modern Moral Philosophy,"2 which is widely credited with sparking the late-twentieth-century revival of virtue ethics, John Laird analyzed the broader role of character in ethics in an article in Mind entitled "Act-Ethics and AgentEthics . "3 There Laird described the contrast between the two conceptions of ethics as follows: "By the morality of the act I mean the morality of specific willed actions. By the morality of the agent I mean a morality whose central conception is a man's moral character."4 I take the act-agent contrast, as understood by Laird and others who make this distinction, as distinguishing the primary object of 1 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, "The Neglect of Virtue," Ethics 85 (1974-75): 110-22; Robert B. Louden, "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 20116 ; J. B. Schneewind, "The Misfortunes of Virtue," in Crisp and Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics, 178-200. 2 G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in Crisp and Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics, 26-44. Anscombe's article originally appeared in Philosophy 33 (1958): 26-42. 3 John Laird, "Act-Ethics and Agent-Ethics," Mind 55 (1946): 113-32. 4 Ibid., 113. 237 238 DAVID A. HORNER moral evaluation in the two approaches.5 The focus of act-ethics is on the identification and moral evaluation of particular acttokens (e.g., Larry's telling a falsehood to Tom), which I will understand, following Laird, as specific willed-i.e., intentionalacts , as well as of the types of acts (e.g., lying) they instance.6 The focus of agent-ethics is broader: it involves the identification and moral evaluation of an agent's character, which comprises not only the agent's actions, but also her attitudes, emotions, desires, and sustained patterns of motivation. These are the concerns of an ethics of virtue.7 The distinction between act-ethics and agent-ethics, so described, expresses much of what the differences between virtue and nonvirtue ethical theories amount to.8 Moreover, it illu5 "The mark of a virtue theory of morality is that the primary object of evaluation is persons or inner traits of persons rather than acts" (Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 15). "So for virtue ethics, the primary object of moral evaluation is not the act or its consequences, but rather the agent" (Louden, "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," 204). According to Louden, this distinguishes "the respective conceptual starting-points of agent- and act-centered ethics" (ibid.). 6 Moral particularists like Jonathan Dancy are, on my view, act-ethicists, but they restrict moral evaluation to particular acts only, and deny that there are general moral features or types of acts. See Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). However the focus of act-ethicists typically extends to considerations of types of acts and to the rules or principles under which they fall. 7 A virtue is "a disposition to act, desire, and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable human excellence, an instance of flourishing" (Lee H. Yearley, "Recent Work on Virtue," Religious Studies Review 16 [1990], 2). Virtues are "[c]omplexes involving inner states, representations, feelings, as well as dispositions to act, express feelings, and the exercise of these" Oulius M. Moravcsik, "The Role of Virtue in Alternatives to Kantian and Utilitarian Ethics,'' Philosophia 20 [1990]: 35). "Virtues are not just dispositions to actions. They are determinations of our emotions, passions, desires, and concerns. They are patterns of saliency, attention, perception, and judgment" (Robert C. Roberts, "Virtues and Rules," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 [1991]: 329). 8 It does not...

<i>Target Centred Virtue Ethics</i>

Background In the dynamic realm of business, ethics serves as a critical compass, guiding the delineation between right and wrong actions. Gaining momentum as a focal point within organisational discourse, the concept of ethics has burgeoned into a cornerstone element of corporate identity and operations. Objectives This study aims to dissect the theoretical underpinnings of moral virtues—specifically wisdom, justice, courage, and restraint—and their intersection with the managerial profession and associated personality traits. We propose the extension of the Mintzberg model of managerial traits from the perspective of virtue ethics. Methods/Approach Employing a theoretical review methodology, this investigation traverses through each identified moral virtue, engaging with contemporary research and scholarly publications within the domain of virtue ethics. Results The analysis affirms that virtue ethics, with its emphasis on character and morality, is instrumental in shaping the framework for managerial conduct and decision-making. The exploration identifies a symbiotic relationship between managerial virtues within the Mintzberg model of managerial traits, highlighting how these elements collectively contribute to the effectiveness and ethical grounding of managerial practices. Conclusions The findings underscore the indispensability of moral virtues and specific personality traits in the cultivation of proficient and ethically oriented managerial professionals. The extended Mintzberg model can be a relevant starting point for a more detailed discussion regarding virtue ethics in a globalised economy.

「幸福」是諮商的目的嗎？「幸福」是否具有倫理道德等價值的意涵？亞里斯多德等人從至善、德行的觀點來理解幸福，傳統心理諮商強調價值中立，因此若從至善或德行等價值的觀點來理解幸福似乎容易招致傳統心理諮商的質疑與否定。然而，心理諮商在修復個案的心理創傷時，其最終目的也不外乎要使個案有能力走向美好人生，給予個案追求幸福的支持力量。因此，如果立基於德行論的哲學諮商模式，能夠與個案一同致力於自我發展、追求幸福的良好生活，那麼相信，作為助人追求幸福的哲學諮商，也能夠像心理諮商那樣成為一種有效的助人模式，故而就此方面觀之，心理諮商與哲學諮商二者在協助追求個案的幸福與快樂的目的方面，二者之間並無矛盾與衝突。亞里斯多德認為德行是幸福人生的核心，幸福與德行幾乎是共生的關係，德行是幸福必要且不可缺少的條件。麥金泰爾致力於復興亞里斯多德至多瑪斯以來的德行論傳統，致力於將「德行」重新放入社會制度、社會生活等整個公共領域之核心地位，由此建構出一種有助於成就美好人生技巧的探究模式。麥金泰爾強調社會背景脈絡之於德行的重要性，他主張社會背景脈絡至少包含三重要環節：德行實踐的活動、行動者（德行主體）的人生敘述、傳統。德行的踐行與理解皆需透過這三環節才得以完成。本文探討麥金泰爾的德行論三環節如何應用在諮商活動中，幫助個案透過理性思維來澄清自己的概念，如何藉由道德推論來認知與堅固自己所堅守的價值，進而成就其理想中的幸福。

Ahlak felsefesinin geçmişten bu yana en önemli kavramlarından olan erdem, epistemolojide de 1980 sonrasında gündeme alınmış, akabinde erdem epistemolojisi, felsefî araştırmanın gelişen alanlarından biri haline gelmiştir. Fail temelli bir yaklaşım olan erdem epistemolojisinde entelektüel erdemin ne olduğuna ilişkin farklı anlayışlar alanda iki ana akımı, güvenilirci yaklaşım ve mesuliyetçi yaklaşımı ortaya çıkarmıştır. Entelektüel erdemleri karakter özellikleri olarak ele alan ve entelektüel erdemleri ahlakî erdemler ile yakınlaştıran mesuliyetçi yaklaşımın önde gelen ismi Linda T. Zagzebski’dir (1946-). Zihnin Erdemleri (1996) eserinde teorik ahlak ile normatif epistemoloji arasında bir ilişki kuran Zagzebski, epistemik değerlendirmenin ahlakî bir değerlendirme türü olduğunu öne sürer. Bu çalışmada öncelikle Zagzebski’nin erdem epistemolojisi tartışmalarında nerede konumlandığı gösterilmektedir. Akabinde çalışma, Zagzebski’yi bilgi ile ahlak arasında bağ kurmaya iten sebepleri tespit etmekte, onun erdem teorisinde bu bağın nasıl kurulduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Zagzebski’nin entelektüel ve ahlakî erdemleri yakınlaştırma kaygısı, yani teorisinin arka planındaki saikler çalışmada şu maddeler altında sunulmuştur: 1- Çağdaş felsefede natüralist yaklaşımların epistemolojide empirik çalışmaları öne çıkarması ve epistemolojinin normatif boyutunun ihmal edilmesi, 2- Kadim düşünceden kopan modern felsefede ahlakın çerçevesinin daraltılması ve epistemoloji ile ahlak arasındaki ortak hususlara dikkat çekilmemesi, 3- Epistemolojide mevcut yaklaşımların bilginin değeri problemine açıklama sunmada yetersiz kalması, 4- Eylem temelli modern ahlak kuramlarının sorunlu yapılarının epistemolojideki teorilere yansıması, 5- İçselcilik ve dışsalcılık gibi epistemolojinin kendi iç tartışmalarında çıkmazların aşılamaması. Zagzebski, söz konusu problemleri gözeterek alternatif bir erdem teorisi teklif etmektedir. Onun teklif ettiği motivasyon temelli mesuliyetçi erdem anlayışına göre erdem iki bileşenden oluşmakta, motivasyon unsurunun yanında güvenilir başarı unsurunu da ihtiva etmektedir. Zagzebski, motivasyon temelli erdem teorisini hem entelektüel erdemlere hem de ahlakî erdemlere ilişkin değerlendirme sunabilecek vüsatte kurgular. O, teorisi dahilinde etik ile epistemoloji arasındaki benzerlikleri ve ilişkileri göstermeye çalışır. Üstelik Zagzebski, erdem teorisinin epistemolojide değer problemi, bilginin tanımı, Gettier meseleleri gibi problemlere çözüm sunduğunu öne sürer. Teorisinin diğer teorilere göre avantajlarını ortaya koyar. Söz konusu yaklaşım Zagzebski nazarında ahlakî ve epistemik değerlendirme arasındaki keskin ayrımı anlamsızlaştırmaktadır. Bu itibarla o, ahlakın sahasını genişleterek entelektüel erdemlerin ahlaki erdemlerin bir türü olduğunu, normatif epistemolojinin ise etiğin bir alanı olduğunu savunur. Söz konusu teorik çerçevede ahlakta eylemlerin değerlendirilmesine paralel bir şekilde inançlar değerlendirilecektir. Ortaya koyduğu kaygılarla Zagzebski, çağdaş felsefeye ilişkin oldukça önemli sorunlara dikkat çekmiş, sorunları çözmeye yönelik teorisiyle de çok mühim bir teşebbüste bulunmuştur. Hususen erdemin neliğine dair detaylı açıklamalar sunması, erdem teorisinin diğer yaklaşımlara göre avantajlı olduğu noktalara işaret etmesi, erdemin motivasyon birleşeni ile yetinmeyip başarı unsuruna da dikkat çekmesi, entelektüel erdemler ve ahlakî erdemler arasındaki ilişkileri, yakınlığı göstermesi, Zagzebski’nin erdem teorisinin dikkate değer yönlerini oluşturur. Zagzebski, teorisinde normatif epistemoloji ile teorik etik arasındaki irtibatı gösterecek hususları ortaya koymaktadır. Bununla birlikte kanaatimizce Zagzebski’nin erdem teorisi ile ahlak sahasını genişletme iddiasında bulunmasından ziyade etik ve epistemoloji arasındaki bağlantıyı tesis etme iddiasında kalması, onun teorisini daha savunulabilir kılacaktır.

Taking a Sartrean existentialist viewpoint towards business ethics, in particular, concerning the question of the nature of businesspersons’ moral character, provides for a dramatically distinct set of reflections from those afforded by the received view on character, namely that of Aristotelian-based virtue ethics. Insofar as Sartre’s philosophy places human freedom at center stage, I argue that the authenticity with which a businessperson approaches moral situations depends on the degree of consciousness he or she has of the various choices at stake. Finally, I consider some practical changes in business ethics education, managerial decision-making, and business organizations that Sartrean reflections might prompt.

This essay proposes that liberal democracy cannot survive unless a monistic virtue ethics permeates its culture, A monistic philosophical conception of virtue ethics has its roots in natural law theory and, for that reason, offers a rationally defensible basis for a unified moral vision in a pluralistic society. Such a monistic virtue ethics--insofar as it is a virtue ethics--forms individual character so that a person not only knows how to act, but desires to act that way and, moreover, possesses the integration of character to be able to act that way. This is a crucial consideration, for immoral choices create a bad character that inclines the individual to increasingly worse choices, A nation whose members lack moral virtue cannot sustain its commitment to freedom and equality for all.

Although St Thomas Aquinas famously claimed that his Summa Theologiae was written for &amp;apos;beginners&amp;apos;, contemporary readers find it unusually difficult. Now, amid a surge of interest in virtue ethics J. Budziszewski clarifies and analyzes the text&amp;apos;s challenging arguments about the moral, intellectual, and spiritual virtues, with a spotlight on the virtue of justice. In what might be the first contemporary commentary on Aquinas&amp;apos;s virtue ethics, he juxtaposes the original text with paraphrase and detailed discussion, guiding us through its complex arguments and classical rhetorical figures. Keeping an eye on contemporary philosophical issues, he contextualizes one of the greatest virtue theorists in history and brings Aquinas into the interdisciplinary debates of today. His brisk and clear style illuminates the most crucial of Aquinas&amp;apos; writings on moral character and guides us through the labyrinth of this difficult but pivotal work.

As a result of the rise of neo-Aristotelianism in recent times, the discussion of 'virtue' has led to the question of whether virtue ethics can exist as a sound system. Prior to this, there was no normative standard for 'virtue', deontology ignored human nature, and utilitarianism focused more on instrumental reason, ignoring the plurality of the 'good'. Anscombe defined 'virtue ethics' in his Modern Moral Philosophy, and Nussbaum built on this by arguing that goodness does not depend only on the rationality of the actor, but also on morality and institutions, and Hesterhaus provided a normative interpretation of virtue ethics from an Aristotelian standpoint. However, as virtue ethics defines and regulates virtue ethics, it is difficult to form a logically coherent system, as either virtue ethics is more or less connected to other ethics, and there are even contradictions between specific claims.

As a result of the rise of neo-Aristotelianism in recent times, the discussion of 'virtue' has led to the question of whether virtue ethics can exist as a sound system. Prior to this, there was no normative standard for 'virtue', deontology ignored human nature, and utilitarianism focused more on instrumental reason, ignoring the plurality of the 'good'. Anscombe defined 'virtue ethics' in his Modern Moral Philosophy, and Nussbaum built on this by arguing that goodness does not depend only on the rationality of the actor, but also on morality and institutions, and Hesterhaus provided a normative interpretation of virtue ethics from an Aristotelian standpoint. However, as virtue ethics defines and regulates virtue ethics, it is difficult to form a logically coherent system, as either virtue ethics is more or less connected to other ethics, and there are even contradictions between specific claims.

Virtue ethicists assume that the notion of (moral) character should hold a prominent place in our moral thought. In this paper, I offer an argument in support of this view. Central to my argument is a reflection on what it means to be committed to a principle of action. I argue that the notion of commitment is inherently connected to the notion of moral character in two ways. The first is based on the idea that an action that expresses our character is an action that we own in the most substantial way. I suggest that the notion of owning one’s action can be cashed out through the idea of committing to a practical principle. The second connection arises from the thought that the notion of moral character refers to a persistent, enduring moral identity. I argue that in order for a person to be genuinely committed to a principle, she must act in accord with it in a way that is not merely consistent, but persistent across a number of situations. Accordingly, to say of someone that they are committed to a principle of action is eo ipso to ascribe them an enduring moral character. Against this background, I turn to a reading of Aristotle’s notion of virtue as hexis prohairetike as a paradigm example of how the idea of enduring moral commitment may be spelled out in more specific detail.

The Thomist 73 (2009): 621-46 FROM MEDIEVAL VOLUNTARISM TO HURSTHOUSE'S VIRTUE ETHICS KEVIN E. O'REILLY Milltown Institute Dublin, Ireland IN RECENT DECADES there has been an attempt to reinstate virtue ethics in moral theorizing and debate. One contribution in this regard is that of Rosalind Hursthouse, whose book On Virtue Ethics, 1 seeks a rapprochement between an Aristotelianinspired virtue ethics and Kantian deontology. Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics captures the interest of a Thomist in part because of her discussion of the ends in the light of which we evaluate plants, animals, and human beings as members of their respective species. Her reflections bear a certain resemblance to Thomas Aquinas's observations concerning the natural inclinations (at STh I-II, q. 94, a. 2). While Philippa Foot pioneered contemporary discussion concerning the subject of ethical naturalism,2 Hursthouse, building upon Foot's work, has led the way in discussing the "ends" (which bear a certain similarity to Aquinas's "natural inclinations ") that are characteristic of embodied beings, that is to say, of humans and of other animals. Her project, however, reveals a certain operative anthropological dualism. Put briefly, rationality is not constrained in its deliberations by the parameters suggested by our animal "ends"; it ultimately enjoys an absolute freedom in imposing its own "ends" as though from outside the corporeal conditions of our being. Thus, in transcending the 1 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 2 P. Foot, "Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" OxfordJournal ofLegal Studies 15 (1995): 1-14. 621 622 KEVIN O'REILLY bodily dimensions of human being, rationality is free to manipulate them according to its own designs. As I will demonstrate, Hursthouse's account betrays some of the same features as are found in the theorizing of John Duns Scotus concerning the ethical life, albeit in a mutated form.3 Scotus's conception of ethics, however, constitutes a rupture with an Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics, whose major medieval proponent was Thomas Aquinas, not least because of his treatment of the natural inclinations-which treatment also results, I will argue, in an operative anthropological dualism. If, however, we are hylomorphically constituted as body-soul unities, our bodies and their natural inclinations must necessarily enter into our appraisal of what conduces to human flourishing; if it does not, ethics becomes voluntarist in nature. History shows that Scotus's speculations contributed to the death of the virtue-ethics tradition that arguably culminated in Aquinas. Clearly, it is not possible to predict the future of contemporary virtue ethics; nevertheless, given the historical precedent of Scotus, there are grounds for grave misgivings about a virtue ethics grounded in a dualistic anthropology. Ultimately, 3 My line of argument does not require me to establish a causal link between Scotus and Hursthouse. It simply hinges on the similarity between Scotus's and Hursthouse's attitudes towards the will and human nature. Nevertheless, Hursthouse's speculations do unfold in dialogue with Kant, whose moral philosophy arguably traces its genealogy back to Scotus. In particular, she attempts to effect a rapprochement between Aristotle and Kant when dealing with emotion and motivation (On Virtue Ethics, 91££.), seemingly unaware of the kind of developments indicated in this article, developments which arguably render such a rapprochement impossible. For a treatment of the significance ofScotus's treatment of the will and morality for Kant's ethics, see Hannes Mohle, "Will und Moral: Zur Voraussetzung der Ethik des Johannes Duns Scotus und ihrer Bedeutung fiir die Ethik Immanuel Kants," in Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Methchild Dreyer, eds.,]ohn Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 573-94. Ingham and Dreyer summarize Scotus's historical legacy as follows: "Scotus's philosophical legacy ... can be summarized as an attention to personal, subjective awareness, in the light of rational principles. These principles link logic, ontology, and ethics to form a whole whose unifying principle is the person in the act of selfreflection . In his followers, these principles will be developed and enhanced throughout the fourteenth century. The principles will influence the thought of Ockham, as we know, but also thinkers such as Suarez, Molina, Leibniz, Wollf, and Kant" (Mary Beth Ingham...