Beyond Aristotle … and Beyond Newton: Thomas Aquinas on an Infinite Creation

Abstract

The Thomist 68 (2004): 287-314 BEYOND ARISTOTLE ... AND BEYOND NEWTON: THOMAS AQUINAS ON AN INFINITE CREATION1 THOMAS P. BUKOWSKI Falls Church, Virginia WHAT WAS St. Thomas Aquinas's final word on the possibility of an infinite creation? According to him creation as we have it is not infinite. But could it be? Or could any part of it be? That is, if the Creator so willed, could he create an entity or multitude that would be infinite and have its infinity not successively but simultaneously? Thomas's answer may surprise those who are not particularly well versed in the history of medieval philosophy-and some who are. Still, all are likely to be intrigued by his going beyond what would later be Isaac Newton's view ofa three-dimensional world, yet adhering increasingly to the Aristotelian Weltanschauung of a "formful" cosmos. By the end we shall see that, late in his career, 1 Tom Bukowski (1928-2002) was my close friend, going back to student days ca 1954-57 atthe Pontifical Institute ofMediaeval StudiesandUniversity ofToronto Graduate Philosophy program. It was there that he started his studies ofThomas on the eternity of the world, when Ignatius Eschmann, O.P., held a seminar on Thomas's opuscula, and Tom drew the De aetemitate mundi as his assignment. Already at that time, his study ofvocabulary and such led him to judge that that work of Thomas's was not, as had been said, a late work, but rather seemed to have much in common with the Commentary on the Sentences treatment of the topic. He wentoff to teachbefore finishing his doctorate, buteventually completed his studies in Strasbourg, France, where in 1972 he presented a dissertation entitled: "Le probleme de l'eternire du monde auXlllieme siecle parisien." Subsequentlyheworked outside ofacademia, but he kept up his interest in mediaeval studies and published a series of articles close to his original interest, all of which I would recommend to readers of The Thomist (a list is appended at the end of the article). The present article he left unpublished at the time of his death, and thus it does not have his personal imprimatur. I decided, in consultation with his family, to send itto The Thomist.-Lawrence Dewan, O.P., Dominican College ofPhilosophy and Theologi, Ottawa, Canada. 287 288 THOMAS P. BUKOWSKI Thomas does go beyond Aristotle, declaring that an actually infinite creature-that is, a created infinity that would be actual rather than merely potential-is possible in itself; but he concludes that it is impossible in view of the wisdom with which God creates. It would be best for our purposes to regard God's wisdom, however, as not confined to the scope of the divinity itself; that is, we must include consideration of God vis-a-vis creation and of his wisdom as respecting the intellect and wisdom of creatures. According to Thomas a created actual infinity would be thoroughly known and understood by God. Now, it is true that questions of God's knowledge are separate from questions of his wisdom; nevertheless, it seems hard to see how an actual infinity would counter his wisdom: from a modern standpoint, what could be the reason? But his wisdom takes into account-it respects-the intellect and wisdom of angel and man. It is at least under this aspect of consideration for finite wisdom that an actual infinity will, in the last stages of the development of Thomas's thinking on the subject, raise insuperable problems.2 Yet, along the way Thomas works into his teaching, and holds to the end, some conclusions that may be truly remarkable coming from a medieval author. As we pursue our subject, the phrase "actual infinity" will mean some "actually infinite, created entity," if "entity" may extend to a multitude of individuals. On the negative side, we shall exclude from our study (except for rare, incidental references) questions of: divine, that is, uncreated, infinity; potential, rather than actual, infinities of any kind (the spatial extent of our known universe, for example, which is potentially infinite in that it could 2 On the finally insuperable problems see below (e.g., section II.D). Much that we say here...