Abstract
Beware of Safety Journal: Analytic Philosophy Manuscript ID APHI-Dec-2017-OA-083.R2 Wiley - Manuscript type: Original Article Keywords: safety, sensitvity, knowledge, epistemology, epistemic interest Abstract: Safety, as discussed in contemporary epistemology, is a feature of true beliefs. Safe beliefs, when formed by the same method, remain true in close-by possible worlds. I argue that our beliefs being safely true serves no recognisable epistemic interest and, thus, that this notion of safety should play no role in epistemology. Epistemologists have been misled by failing to distinguish between a feature of beliefs — being safely true — and a feature of believers, namely being safe from error. The latter is central to our epistemic endeavours: we want to be able to get right answers, whatever they are, to questions of interest. I argue that we are sufficiently safe from error (in some relevant domain) by being sufficiently sensitive (to relevant distinctions).
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