Abstract
This contribution argues that although the latest EU treaties formalized the Commission presidency to substantial degree, it remains a constitutionally weak office for the provision of political leadership. The capacity to lead thus still strongly depends on the individual incumbent. As a first step, the article examines the legal-procedural structure of the office before and after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. Secondly, it analyzes the political leadership performance of the Commission president José Barroso in comparison with his predecessor Jacques Delors. In bridging formal institutional rules with concrete performances this article contributes to the understanding of the relationship between structure and agency in international institutions as well as to the growing literature on political leadership in the European Union.
Highlights
The president of the European Commission has always played a key role in the political system of the European Union (EU) and the larger process of European integration (Spence, 2006, p. 27)
The analysis reveals that the office’s strong formalization inside the Commission had only very limited effects on the office’s political power vis-à-vis other EU institutions, but was an attempt to bring the office in line with increased institutional constraints
Applying the agency-structure duality to the supranational level of the European Union, this article argues that the weaker the institutional structure of an office, here the Commission presidency, the more the provision of political leadership by its incumbents depends on their personal agency
Summary
The president of the European Commission has always played a key role in the political system of the European Union (EU) and the larger process of European integration (Spence, 2006, p. 27). Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 68-79 integration In both acknowledging and qualifying this academic enthusiasm, the paper’s aims are twofold. It determines to what extent the institutional position of the office did change after the latest EU Treaty, namely the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. In this regard, the analysis reveals that the office’s strong formalization inside the Commission had only very limited effects on the office’s political power vis-à-vis other EU institutions, but was an attempt to bring the office in line with increased institutional constraints. Its analysis demonstrates that the office’s latest formalization did not substantially increase the president’s political role and authority at the European level (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012, pp. 149-150; Rauh & Zürn, 2014, p. 126; Zürn, 2013, pp. 19, 32)
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