Between Morality and Evolution: Naturalizing the Sentiment of Sympathy

Abstract

This article explores the consequences of these propositions: (1) the enlightenment made popular a belief in causal determinism – the idea that every event has a cause. (2) The Scottish enlightenment Adam Smith’s moral theory begins from the notion that the morality behind human actions is practical and based on the sentiment of sympathy, a mechanism that we use to place ourselves in others’ shoes. (3) Certain contemporary ethical theories use empirical evidence and evolutionary arguments to explain the origin of sympathy and to support the interference of evolutionary pressures in our moral sentiments. These propositions together have the following consequences: (3) Different biological interpretations of sympathy can lead us to different results from a practical standpoint. (4) So, our understanding of the evolutionary dimension of sympathy has implications for moral theories that have sympathy as their base. Thus, the combination of the Enlighten ideas and moral sentimentalism led to a belief in the causal determination of human emotions, and its causes. Bearing in mind that empirical investigations have demonstrated how evolutionary biology can influence our moral sentiments, my purpose is to analyze whether Smithean morality might be jeopardized by these contentions. To this end, I test whether Smith’s sympathy would be compatible with evolutionary accounts, in particular, with Sharon Street’s view.