Abstract

ABSTRACTThe German regime on the use of military force provides an important reference point for legal comparison. In a seminal judgment of 1994, the Constitutional Court identified a constitution-based requirement for each military deployment to have parliamentary approval. The formalities of the involvement of the Bundestag were, in 2005, codified in a statute. Recent German participation in coalitions of the willing have raised the question whether such operations are still covered by the constitutional bases, and participation in anti-Islamic State action in Syria is currently under review by the Constitutional Court. The article concludes that the tension between the need to effectively integrate military forces into multinational operations, democratic accountability, and judicial oversight has been uniquely resolved in the German constitution and statutory and case law. It illustrates the feasibility of upholding standards of democracy and the rule of law in foreign and military affairs.

Highlights

  • The German regime on the use of military force provides an important reference point for legal comparison

  • The article concludes that the tension between the need to effectively integrate military forces into multinational operations, democratic accountability, and judicial oversight has been uniquely resolved in the German constitution and statutory and case law

  • In 1956, it amended its constitution, the Basic Law of 1949, in order to allow the state to contribute to the integrated forces of NATO for defending Western Europe against a possible communist aggression

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Summary

Historical context and current practice

German history has produced a unique and complicated constitutional regime on the deployment of the German military abroad. The end of the global East–West split went hand in hand with German reunification and the formal international recognition of the state’s national sovereignty in 1990,1 enabling the UN Security Council to overcome its prior paralysis and to authorise military action against threats to the peace This contributed to a ‘fundamental reorientation’: both from the side of Germany’s allies and in some quarters from inside the country, the expectation arose that Germany would actively engage its military towards achieving world peace and security. It remained impossible to amend formally the constitutional text so as to explicitly allow for and regulate such military action In this political deadlock, the German constitutional court issued in 1994 a truly law-making judgment.. Nationen (Springer-Verlag, 1990) 29. 6BVerfGE [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] 90, 286, judgment of 12 July 1994 – 2 BvE 3/92 –, – 2 BvE 5/93 –, – 2 BvE 7/93 –, – 2 BvE 8/93 –

PETERS
The constitutional framework
The lead judgment of 1994: the invention of the parliamentary prerogative
The AWACS II judgment of 2008: when is parliamentary approval required?
The Lisbon treaty judgment of 2009: red line for EU operations?
Overview
The training mission in Northern Iraq of 2014
The trigger concept of ‘deployment’
Concrete expectation of combat is sufficient
Formalities
The aborted statutory reform
Separation of powers
Shifting rationale: from military to democracy
Making good for executivist NATO transformations
Non-delegation à l’allemande: ‘Wesentlichkeitstheorie’
Judicial control of deployment decisions
Abstract control of norms?
Organstreit proceedings
Overstepping the mandate of the Bundestag
No constitutional complaints of soldiers
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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