Abstract

Legality in the Global South suffers from problems of application by convenience. Some rules are applied, and some are not, depending on certain actors, such as the State, the stakeholders, or others. This undermines legitimation as constructed by legality and due process. These problems are connected to a wider complex formed by coloniality, internal colonialism, and a form of functional differentiation that limits autonomy of the different social systems. This complex of structural properties allows States and other actors to systematically use one system against the other or—within a given system—one level of rules against the other. This was the case in Ecuador: in the initial months of quarantine due to Covid-19, the government took decisions about external state bonds following international legislation—and quite contrary ones related to local work contracts. Once again, legality followed different paths in diverse cases. Ecuadorian economic authorities accept and respect conditions on external public bonds which are protected by some complex and specific clauses to secure the payment. The same authorities have different practices towards international and national legislation that were organized in the sense of legal subsidiarity. This text will explore reasons and effects of legal de-differentiation in the Global South in times of crisis. The Ecuadorian case in time of Covid-19 helps to understand how structural problems related to the lack of autonomy of the legal system are perpetuated and lead to effects of convenient political action.

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