Between Individual Autonomy and Centralized Control: Outlining an Evolutionary Model of Neo-endogenous Rural Development

Abstract

The chapter takes concepts of evolutionary governance theory to the understanding of neo-endogenous rural development in a European context. It does this from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Rural development is modelled as the increasing realisation over time of gains from interaction by rural stakeholders. The model exhibits two dynamically stable equilibria, which depict declining and prospering regions. An external government authority stimulates neo-endogenous rural development by helping decentralised actors to coordinate on the superior of the two equilibria. This intervention may be possible and desirable without giving up the autonomy of local decision makers. The approach thus pursues a middle way between “spontaneous order” and centralized control that avoids the disadvantages of top-down policies traditionally dominating in rural and agricultural policy. Moreover, it illustrates the path, inter-, and goal dependencies of evolutionary governance. Because initial conditions matter, outcomes cannot be planned or engineered from the outside.