Between commons and anticommons: a nested common-private interface framework

Abstract

The collapse of the former Soviet Union signaled failure of large-scale experiment in communitarian property. Privatization reform consequently was taken as the start point to transfer the planned economy to a market economy by the post socialist countries. This also occurred in economic transition countries such as China. However, in overcoming the tragedy of the commons privatization might create anticommons problems. Here we develop a nested common-private interface framework from the perspective of resource system and resource units and apply this framework to explain reforms of rangeland property in China and Kyrgyzstan. We confirmed that the root of the dilemma, either caused by commons or anticommons, can be attributed to the interface mismatch between individual elements and common elements. Trying to overcome the dilemma by changing property arrangements alone cannot eliminate the incentive mismatch caused by the common-private interface. Institutions aimed at alleviating the mismatch are accordingly required. Theoretically, this framework converts Ostrom’s concept of commons into liberal commons that the members have options to exit, which is becoming increasingly common in the current global context of marketization. In the real world, this framework can serve to understand the property reform progress of transition countries, and may enlighten future property reforms.