Better the Devil You Know? How Fringe Terrorism Can Induce an Advantage for Moderate Nonviolent Campaigns

Margherita Belgioioso,Stefano Costalli,Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

doi:10.1080/09546553.2018.1559836

Abstract

ABSTRACT Fringe terrorism is common during nonviolent campaigns. We examine how this can modify the strategic environment between dissident groups and the state in ways that present both challenges and opportunities to moderate factions. Terrorism is intended to promote violent escalation in a conflict, but we argue that fringe terrorist activities in a nonviolent campaign under certain conditions can induce an advantage for well-organized moderate factions. The risk of escalation following terrorism can give the government more incentives to offer concessions to moderate campaign leaders if the movement can credibly prevent armed escalation. The ability to control and prevent violence is more likely when nonviolent movements have a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership, as such campaigns are better able to prevent shifts by supporters towards violent fringes. Using new data on terrorist attacks by factions sharing the same overall objectives as ongoing nonviolent campaigns, we show that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to see substantial gains in spite of fringe terrorist activities when a movement has a hierarchical structure and a centralized leadership.

Highlights

Recent research has argued that nonviolent dissent tends to be more effective than armed violence and highlighted its many strategic advantages.[1]
In line with previous research, we find that larger civil resistance campaigns are more likely to see substantial political gains
We find that repression appears to make substantial political gains less likely, and concessions are less likely during the Cold War period

Summary

Introduction

Recent research has argued that nonviolent dissent tends to be more effective than armed violence and highlighted its many strategic advantages.[1]. By contrast, offering concessions to nonviolent movements is less unattractive, since “there is more space for negotiations, compromise, power sharing and even complete accommodation when regime members do not fear that losses of power will directly translate into rolling heads” Governments facing both large-scale nonviolent campaigns and fringe terrorism have greater incentives to offer concessions to moderates if this can help to avoid escalating violent conflict and to secure a more controlled transition. Violent fringe groups cannot grow and become vulnerable to counterterrorism efforts.[38] In sum, nonviolent dissident campaigns that are hierarchically structured and have a centralized leadership should be more likely to be offered political concessions when fringe terrorism and a demonstrated potential for escalating violence occur. The majority of campaigns both with and without terrorism do not see concessions

Systematic Terrorism

Hierarchical Structure

Constant Observations

Conclusion