Better Management and Better Union Leadership

Abstract

UP TO 1935, our country had been giving almost no support to collective action by workers. The Wagner Act-often cited as labor's Magna Charta-signed on July 5, 1935, made it illegal for employers to interfere with union organization of workers. Now for the first time workers no longer had to fear loss of jobs or permanent ostracism because of flirtation with unionization. The public had at last followed other democratic nations in encouraging collective bargaining and signed agreements between unions and employers. And by this action unions were destined to become important and controversial factors in our economic, political, and industrial life. The law was heralded by its advocates as the foundation of everlasting industrial harmony. It was-so they proclaimed-a long-needed democratic implement enabling workers to cope with the power of employers. It would mark the beginning of unparalleled industrial progress. The autocratic and unilateral system, traditional in industry, would give way to democratic processes and industrial jurisprudence. Workers, through their representatives, would negotiate contracts ensuring a higher standard of living and improved working conditions. These contracts, clearly defining the rights and obligations of labor and management, would dispel suspicion and misunderstanding. All of this would assure the public of prodigious benefits. But the advocates of the law failed to recognize that the field of labor relations is primarily one of human relations fraught with human frailties and emotions difficult to control by a code of behavior spelled out in a dull labor contract. The sponsors of the act had given little or no heed to the paucity of union and industrial leadership prepared to solve unforeseen obstacles. They had discounted, apparently, the stupendous task of creating trade-union consciousness and responsibility among the millions of union recruits. They had missed sight of a split in the labor movement and its devastating results. They had overestimated industry's capacity to adapt itself to a new type of employer-employee relationship. They had discounted the opportunities for abuse by power-drunk union leaders. Perhaps the sponsors of the act did foresee these perplexing aspects; and perhaps they were content to rely on public pressure for arresting any social evils arising from collective bargaining.