Abstract
Evaluation de l'argument de Berkeley selon lequel les qualites premieres de l'etendue, de la figure et du mouvement, ne peuvent etre abstraites des qualites secondes des idees, qui n'existent que dans l'esprit. A partir d'une reconstruction de la definition des qualites sensibles chez Locke, l'A. montre que l'argument de Berkeley ne parvient pas a refuter la position de Locke.
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